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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS GALVESTON DIVISION
3	AARON WILSON GARNER . G-07-CV-221
4	vs GALVESTON, TEXAS . DECEMBER 17, 2009
5	. 10:31 A.M. BP AMOCO CHEMICAL COMPANY .
6 7	BP AMOCO POLYMERS, INC., . BP CORPORATION NORTH . AMERICA, INC
8	
9	TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH HOYT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11	DAY 12 OF 13
12	APPEARANCES:
13	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
14	Anthony Buzbee Sean O'Rourke
15	Peter Kelley Taaffe Nick Simon
16	The Buzbee Law Firm 600 Travis Street
17	Suite 7300 Houston, Texas 77002
18	Gabe Vick
19	Arnold & Itkin, LLP 1401 McKinney Street
20	Suite 2550 Houston, Texas 77010
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22 23	Drogoodings reserved by meshanisel stone
24	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.
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     APPEARANCES: (Continued)
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     FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
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          Jim Galbraith
          Lyle Courtney
          Anthony Brown
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          April Marburger
          McLeod Alexander Powel & Apffel
5
          PO Box 629
          Galveston, Texas 77553
6
7
     OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER:
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          Cheryll K. Barron, CSR, CM, FCRR
9
          U.S. District Court
          515 Rusk Street
10
          Houston, Texas 77002
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     ALSO PRESENT:
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          Ken Panozzo
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10:33	1	problem with.
	2	MR. O'ROURKE: Well, your Honor, do you have a copy of
	3	the fourth amended
	4	THE COURT: I've got what you filed last night.
10:33	5	MR. O'ROURKE: Great. We managed to go
	6	through and we've withdrawn a few additional things and we've
	7	also they've agreed to allow a few things in, and there was
	8	the one issue regarding the witness statements that are
	9	Exhibits 247 to 260.
10:33	10	THE COURT: 247 to 260. All right. What is the
	11	what is it? You want to offer them into evidence?
	12	MR. O'ROURKE: Yes, your Honor.
	13	THE COURT: Are these the plaintiffs' or just other
	14	witnesses?
10:34	15	MR. O'ROURKE: These are other witnesses, your Honor.
	16	THE COURT: All right. What's the objection?
	17	MR. COURTNEY: Hearsay, your Honor.
	18	THE COURT: Certainly these would be hearsay. My
	19	question then would be whether or not these exhibits is
10:34	20	there a disagreement as to whether or not these exhibits were
	21	utilized by plaintiff and/or defendant without objection during
	22	the course of the testimony in the case.
	23	MR. O'ROURKE: They were used throughout the case and
	24	without these are the witnesses statements that were
10:34	25	referred to multiple times to directly confront their witnesses

10:34	1	saying that they didn't have any knowledge in their
	2	investigation of people passing out or throwing up. That's why
	3	they were used to show that either they didn't look or chose to
	4	ignore these statements. And they were referred to constantly
10:35	5	by both sides, your Honor.
	6	THE COURT: Okay. And your objection would be?
	7	MR. COURTNEY: It's still hearsay, your Honor.
	8	THE COURT: Hearsay.
	9	MR. O'ROURKE: And, your Honor
10:35	10	THE COURT: Are there portions of these exhibits that
	11	are that address issues that are not already before the
	12	panel?
	13	In other words, is there something that if they
	14	were that if it were redacted it would make it less of a
10:35	15	problem for the defense?
	16	MR. COURTNEY: I'm not sure.
	17	THE COURT: Or is your objection just generally these
	18	are
	19	MR. COURTNEY: It's hearsay, Judge. It's these are
10:35	20	the same kind of statements like Jerry Duke, the statement you
	21	wouldn't let in a couple of days ago.
	22	THE COURT: Yeah, but that's for a different reason.
	23	MR. COURTNEY: These were taken during the same
	24	course.
10:35	25	THE COURT: Correct.

MR. COURTNEY: So, it's still a hearsay.

MR. O'ROURKE: And, your Honor, there's -- I mean, technically, they're not hearsay since they're not being offered for the truth of the matter that they're saying. What we're offering them for and the reason why they came in during this trial is because their witnesses say, "As a part of our investigation, we didn't know that people were complaining of throwing up or passing out."

Well, these -- these are employee interviews that were a part of their investigation, which should have -- and they say they did consider during their investigation; and it goes right to -- to disproving that point.

So, it's not necessarily to prove that somebody did pass out, that that's true. What it's going to show is that they told BP they passed out, and it goes to knowledge. And that's why it's relevant; and that's why it's technically not hearsay, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection and admit it. And I will instruct the jury that Exhibits 247 to 260 are not admitted for the purposes of the truthfulness of the statements but to simply provide notice to BP of a condition that the plaintiffs and others were complaining about.

MR. O'ROURKE: And, then, your Honor, if we could -- I think maybe the best way to proceed would be to go through the

10:36	1	rest of this fourth amended exhibit list and let you know what
	2	has been withdrawn and what has been admitted.
	3	THE COURT: Well, the document will speak for itself
	4	because we're going to file it.
10:37	5	MR. O'ROURKE: Okay. Well, since we filed it last
	6	night, we've worked to iron out some other issues. So, they've
	7	agreed
	8	THE COURT: I see.
	9	MR. O'ROURKE: they've agreed to let some things
10:37	10	in; and we've agreed to withdraw some other exhibits, your
	11	Honor.
	12	MR. COURTNEY: How about at noon, or after lunch, we
	13	just resubmit a new list?
	14	THE COURT: Well, I don't want to have the jury
10:37	15	sitting on the runway, waiting on a list. So, let me ask you,
	16	regarding the fourth amended I'm trying to understand what
	17	you're saying.
	18	MR. O'ROURKE: Sure.
	19	THE COURT: Regarding the fourth amended exhibit list,
10:37	20	you've indicated to me all those exhibits that have been
	21	admitted and, whether over objections or not, they're indicated
	22	as having been admitted.
	23	MR. O'ROURKE: Yes, your Honor.
	24	THE COURT: There's certain exhibits that have been
10:37	25	withdrawn and

10:37	1	MR. O'ROURKE: Correct.
	2	THE COURT: I know there's a lengthy maybe part
	3	of that is reflected in the exhibit list itself.
	4	MR. O'ROURKE: Correct.
10:37	5	THE COURT: Now, taking this document as a completed
	6	document now, having ruled on this portion
	7	MR. O'ROURKE: Sure.
	8	THE COURT: what is it that needs to be corrected
	9	or brought to the Court's attention?
10:38	10	MR. O'ROURKE: Gotcha. Your Honor, Exhibit 13.
	11	THE COURT: Let me just get there.
	12	All right. Thirteen?
	13	MR. O'ROURKE: Defendants have agreed that that should
	14	be admitted.
10:38	15	THE COURT: All right.
	16	MR. O'ROURKE: Exhibit 37, we're now withdrawing.
	17	THE COURT: Thirty-seven. Okay.
	18	MR. O'ROURKE: Skipping on to 100 to 102 100, 101,
	19	102, those are also being withdrawn.
10:38	20	THE COURT: 101 and 102 or all three?
	21	MR. O'ROURKE: All three, your Honor, 100, 101, and
	22	102.
	23	THE COURT: All right.
	24	MR. O'ROURKE: Exhibit 172, 173, and 174 are all being
10:38	25	admitted.

10:38	1	THE COURT: 172, 173, and 174, admitted.
	2	MR. O'ROURKE: As well as 176, 178
	3	THE COURT: All right.
	4	MR. O'ROURKE: and 179.
10:38	5	THE COURT: All right.
	6	MR. O'ROURKE: Those are all admitted.
	7	Number 211, your Honor, is going to be withdrawn.
	8	THE COURT: 211, previously admitted or agreed to but
	9	withdrawn now?
10:39	10	MR. O'ROURKE: Yes, your Honor.
	11	THE COURT: Okay.
	12	MR. O'ROURKE: And 220 is going to be withdrawn.
	13	THE COURT: Okay.
	14	MR. O'ROURKE: 222 is admitted.
10:39	15	THE COURT: All right.
	16	MR. O'ROURKE: And then, with the Court's ruling on
	17	247 through 260, they're admitted
	18	THE COURT: That completes all right. Very good.
	19	All right. Thank you.
10:39	20	MR. O'ROURKE: Thank you, your Honor.
	21	THE COURT: And, yes, you can give us a clean version
	22	of that after lunch because we'll file the cleaned up version
	23	but I'll need to maintain this one for crosschecking.
	24	MR. COURTNEY: Certainly, your Honor.
10:40	25	THE COURT: All right. Did you-all get a copy of the

charge? 1 10:40 2 MR. BROWN: Just now. We didn't realize we had it. 3 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 4 All right. Gentlemen, let me do this so that we 5 can make sure we're focused on the same areas of concern that 10:41 we focused on while in chambers. What I have done is -- I need 6 7 to make sure I've got counsel's attention. 8 MR. BROWN: I'm listening. 9 THE COURT: All right. You can do that. What I have done is I have taken the plaintiffs' 10 10:41 11 restructured portion -- because what they did is they 12 incorporated the instructions that I had given to you-all and then modified them to their satisfaction and now we've talked 13 14 about some changes to those. So, if you would take a look at 10:41 15 your -- I just want to point out where they are. 16 If you would look at your jury charge, the one 17 that I've just given to you, under the "Contentions of Parties" section, you would see that that change has been 18 incorporated -- or reflected in the top portion of the first 19 20 paragraph. 10:42 You would also see in the second paragraph the 21 22 reflection of those that the defendant requested. And you 23 would see the reincorporation of the (c) and (d) portions that 24 the defendant initially had in -- or that I had in my 25 instruction. 10:42

We're still on Page 4. At the bottom of Page 4, 1 10:42 2 you see that the term "contractor" and the doctrine of 3 respondeat superior have been removed. 4 On Page 5 you see "Definitions" has been 5 incorporated. At "proximate cause," you'll see the sole -- or 10:42 single sentence, being the sentence that concludes that 6 7 portion. And that has been taken care of. 8 Under "Negligence," you'll see that I did 9 incorporate the standard definition of "negligence," deleting what I had in there at the beginning. 10 10:43 11 Under "Gross Negligence," you'll see that we --12 let me make sure. Yeah. Under "Gross Negligence," you'll see 13 that I broke out -- or I at least broke that up into two 14 paragraphs. And then the, quote, "the actor" has been replaced 10:43 15 with "BP." 16 And that last paragraph ends with "welfare of the 17 plaintiffs," as I indicated. And I deleted that sentence that says, "If a plaintiff does not establish," that's out. 18 19 Now, here's an area that you both want to take a 20 look at because it's one that we might have to struggle a 10:43 21 little bit with. But if you look at the bottom of Page 7, 22 where it says "Interrogatories," there is an objection -- or 23 will be an objection by BP as to that section. But what I need 24 is a definition -- or needed was a definition of "control." 25 I went back in and re-engineered the (b) portion 10:44

10:45

because the plaintiffs' allegations of negligence relate to maintenance or failure to maintain and properly maintain the facility and plant. It doesn't have anything to do with an instrumentality as I had put it in the charge.

So, if you -- on Page 7, at the bottom it says, "(b), that the cause of the accident (i.e., BP's -- maintenance program) was under the management and control of BP at the time of the negligence, if any, causing the accident that probably occurred."

And then, "'Control' means that BP controlled the time and manner of the maintenance of its facility," because that's really what this case, from the plaintiffs' perspective in part, is about.

Now, we can argue about that; but I want to bring that to your attention specifically as to how I've reworded that. Because it's not like an automobile accident, an automobile that went out of control and that becomes the instrumentality. We're talking about, from what I understand, a release that was a result of lack of maintenance or poor maintenance. It's a part of a scheme, a lack of maintenance or poor maintenance as a result. So, we'll talk about that if we need to and take objections.

Beyond that, I believe all of the other -- just double-check -- all of the other changes that we did to the interrogatories have been reflect -- or are reflected, should I

10:45	1	say.
	2	And that Interrogatory Number 4 individualizes
	3	the claim for damages as it relates to punitive damages.
	4	So, now, go ahead and reflect on that; and you
10:45	5	can certainly give me your appreciation for what I think the
	6	changes
	7	MR. BUZBEE: Your Honor, with regard to what you
	8	focused in on on "control," I think I would respectfully
	9	suggest the word should be "timing" rather than "the time." We
10:46	10	should say, "the timing and manner of the maintenance"; and
	11	that's the only change I would suggest to you.
	12	THE COURT: What page was that on? Seven?
	13	MR. TAAFFE: Yes, your Honor.
	14	MR. BUZBEE: And with that, your Honor, I think that's
10:46	15	sufficient from our perspective.
	16	THE COURT: There is another error that I made that I
	17	think I marked, and I need to bring it to your attention. And
	18	then I'll hear from the other side on this.
	19	Interrogatory Number 1 and there is another
10:46	20	change. Interrogatory Number 1, I take "contractor" out.
	21	That and I think that's the only place. I'll double-check,
	22	but I believe
	23	MR. BROWN: I think it is.
	24	THE COURT: Yeah. So, I wanted to make sure I brought
10:47	25	that to your attention, as well.

Now, as it relates to Page 7, counsel? 1 10:47 2 I know you haven't had a chance to think about it. Do you want to think about what I've said? 3 4 MR. BROWN: Well, just at the outset, I think that the 5 "res" in "res ipsa loquitur" has to be a thing and it has to be 10:47 6 I mean, this is -- a program? That's -- I just don't 7 think that an activity or a procedure --8 THE COURT: But that's where the duty lies. The duty 9 lies in the activity itself. So, as far as negligence is concerned, when a person has a duty to perform and fails to 10 10:47 maintain that duty, that failing becomes the instrumentality, 11 12 if that's your argument. 13 MR. BROWN: Okay. 14 THE COURT: Or a failure of that duty becomes the 10:47 15 basis for the negligence claim. 16 MR. BROWN: Under -- okay. I would just note that the 17 definition of "control" under Chapter 95 to the --THE COURT: Yeah, I can't give that definition. I 18 19 have to structure it to the facts of this case. And I do 20 recognize what you're saying. 10:48 MR. BROWN: And for purposes of the record --21 THE COURT: Because, see, 95 goes to facility, in 22 terms of control of a piece of real estate, a piece of 23 24 geography. We're not talking about control -- at least I think 25 the plaintiff is not talking about control of a facility. 10:48

10:50

They're talking about a control of a program, a duty owed under the maintenance program. And, so, I'll permit your objection at that point.

MR. BROWN: The only trouble is, your Honor, is will I have time logistically to work out a way to tender an alternative definition?

THE COURT: Yes. That's why I said that I know you haven't had a chance to think about it. But I wanted you to be able to see it, and certainly I want to hear what you have to say now just in case it refines my thinking.

But at the same time, I think what we'll probably end up doing -- we're going to check and see if our jury is present. But we probably will just go ahead and send them to lunch early. After all, they just had breakfast. But we'll probably just get them to take an early lunch -- let's go ahead and do that.

(Sotto voce discussion at bench with court staff)

THE COURT: I won't give you more than 10 minutes' rebuttal. But we're talking two and a half hours of time this afternoon. So, I would say 1:00 o'clock. Is that -- that would give us time to get it all in to them, for them to get into the jury room, select a foreperson, and at least commence deliberations and have a full day ahead of them tomorrow. 1:00 o'clock?

MR. BUZBEE: (Nodding head.)

THE COURT: 1:00 o'clock? 1 10:50 2 MR. BROWN: Just before that, your Honor, would you 3 might want us to come in and do the charge conference? 4 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to take your objections --5 except as to this part, I want to go ahead and take your 10:50 6 objections to the charge. 7 MR. BROWN: Oh, on the record? 8 THE COURT: And you reserve the right to certainly 9 make an alternative or correction in this area. So, what I would like to do is take your objections to the charge. 10 10:50 11 Now, you don't have to repeat your -- if they're 12 complete -- and I am looking at your filing from last night, 13 BP's objections to the Court's proposed charge. If these are 14 complete, then I need to simply say that the objections are 10:50 15 overruled and those -- and that the proffers made of 16 interrogatories and definitions are refused except to the 17 extent that the Court has adopted and incorporated them into its proposed and presented charge. 18 19 Now, that takes care of this. MR. BROWN: Yes, your Honor. And for the record, I 20 10:51 filed that with the Court this morning. I guess we can file a 21 22 duplicate on the electronic system. 23 THE COURT: Well, if you -- you filed a hard copy on 24 4? Or you just brought this and gave it to me? 25 MR. BROWN: I brought that and gave it to you. 10:51

THE COURT: Oh, okay. So, this does need to be filed. 1 10:51 2 You can file it right here. 3 MR. BROWN: Okay. 4 THE COURT: You can give it to Kathy here in the 5 courtroom, the case manager in the courtroom. And she can go 10:51 ahead and file it, and the record will reflect the filing as 6 7 well as my ruling. Now, outside of this document -- so, let me 8 say it like this. That's my ruling. All right? 9 MR. BROWN: Okay. Okay. So, the record reflects that. 10 THE COURT: 10:51 Now, outside of this document, there are some 11 12 concerns that you have; and we'll take those up in just a 13 minute. 14 The plaintiff has also filed a proposed jury 10:52 15 charge, and the Court's statement in that regard is the Court 16 would overrule the objections and refuse proposed definitions 17 and interrogatories or changes except to the extent that the Court has incorporated any changes requested in the Court's 18 19 instructions to the jury. Now, that takes care of your 20 instructions, as well. 10:52 And let's start with the plaintiff now. 21 22 what I have already done and what you know is present and 23 reserving the right to make your arguments as it relates to the 24 res ipsa section of this, do you have other objections you need 25 to make? 10:52

10:52	1	MR. BUZBEE: No, sir.
	2	THE COURT: All right.
	3	MR. BROWN: Your Honor, just to protect myself and
	4	make sure under the record, I renew the objections set out in
10:52	5	the pleading, which we will file with the clerk.
	6	And also for the record, given the fact that we
	7	object to Interrogatories Numbers 1, 2, and 3, based on the
	8	fact that there is no evidence or, alternatively, that they are
	9	legally and factually there's legally and factually
10:53	10	insufficient evidence to support those and that they
	11	incorrectly state the legal standards, I would tender our
	12	proposed interrogatories for the Court to consider.
	13	THE COURT: Are those interrogatories already included
	14	in in the in BP's
10:53	15	MR. BROWN: Yes.
	16	THE COURT: objections what is it called
	17	objections and proposed charge?
	18	MR. BROWN: Yes, your Honor.
	19	THE COURT: All right. Then you don't need to
10:53	20	re-tender them. Just tender that document to the case manager
	21	at this time.
	22	MR. BROWN: Understood.
	23	And that also includes our proposed
	24	interrogatories under Chapter 95, which I understand the Court
10:53	25	will not submit?

THE COURT: Correct. 1 10:53 2 MR. BROWN: Okay. 3 THE COURT: All right. We'll need that filed as the 4 objections and requests of the -- of BP for instructions and 5 definitions and interrogatories. 10:54 6 And the Court has previously and will restate its 7 ruling in relationship to that, and that is that they are 8 overruled and they are refused except to the extent 9 incorporated. MR. BROWN: And for the record, I'm tendering a 10 10:54 11 duplicate copy of what the Court has been reading to the clerk for filing. 12 13 THE COURT: Thank you. 14 All right. Now, where are we in terms of any 10:54 15 other objections or corrections to the -- save the res ipsa, 16 are there other objections or corrections that we have not 17 addressed for the defense? MR. BROWN: I do not believe so, your Honor. 18 19 THE COURT: All right. Then, with that reservation, 20 the Court is concluding the objections and corrections and 10:55 21 proposals for the instructions to the jury; and we'll go back 22 to the exhibit team. 23 MR. COURTNEY: We're ready, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. I don't believe I have a copy 24 25 of what you are going to be talking from or about. 10:55

10:55	1	MR. COURTNEY: Your Honor, we have a marked up copy
	2	that we're going to clean up over lunch.
	3	THE COURT: Okay. Hold on just one second. Make sure
	4	I'm not throwing away some goodies here. Try to clean up a
10:55	5	little bit here.
	6	What you've handed to me are BP's third amended
	7	exhibit list, and let's keep it at that. Let's don't change it
	8	to a fourth when you go back and clean it up. All right?
	9	And the report reflects a deletion reflects
10:56	10	that certain exhibits have been deleted and certain have been
	11	admitted; and that's what we're going to go through now,
	12	correct?
	13	MR. COURTNEY: Correct, your Honor.
	14	THE COURT: All right. So, let's see. Let's hear
10:56	15	where you have trouble or difficulty. Is there anything that
	16	you have objection to I'll tell you what. Tell me where the
	17	trouble is, and then we'll go from there.
	18	And give us your name from the record, please.
	19	MS. MARBURGER: I'm sorry, your Honor. My name is
10:56	20	April Marburger.
	21	THE COURT: All right.
	22	MS. MARBURGER: And for the record, I don't think we
	23	have any trouble. I think we resolved everything. So, would
	24	you like us to start with what we've withdrawn?
10:56	25	THE COURT: Yes, Exhibit what is that?

10:56	1	Seventy-six?
	2	MS. MARBURGER: Yes, your Honor. We withdraw
	3	Exhibit 76. We withdraw Exhibit 192.
	4	THE COURT: Okay.
10:57	5	MS. MARBURGER: We withdraw Exhibit 292A.
	6	THE COURT: Hold on just one second. Let me see what
	7	happened here at the bottom. 292?
	8	MS. MARBURGER: A, yes, your Honor, 292A.
	9	THE COURT: All right.
10:57	10	MS. MARBURGER: 293.
	11	THE COURT: Okay.
	12	MS. MARBURGER: We withdraw Exhibit 2013. We withdraw
	13	Exhibit
	14	THE COURT: 2013?
10:57	15	MS. MARBURGER: Yes, your Honor. And Exhibit 2015.
	16	THE COURT: All right.
	17	MS. MARBURGER: Exhibit 2101.
	18	THE COURT: Uh-huh.
	19	MS. MARBURGER: Exhibit 2103.
10:57	20	THE COURT: All right.
	21	MS. MARBURGER: Exhibit 2105, 2106, 2107, 2110, 2201.
	22	THE COURT: Okay.
	23	MS. MARBURGER: 2202, 2206, 2211, 2319.
	24	THE COURT: What's going to happen with 2305?
10:58	25	MS. MARBURGER: 2305? Your Honor, I don't believe

10:58	1	MR. VICK: I think we agreed to admit that one, your
	2	Honor.
	3	THE COURT: Okay. 2305. 2306 is in then, correct?
	4	MS. MARBURGER: Yes, your Honor.
10:58	5	THE COURT: And 2308, 2310, 2312, those will be coming
	6	in?
	7	MR. VICK: Yes, your Honor.
	8	THE COURT: And, now, for 2319, that would be out; is
	9	that right?
10:58	10	MS. MARBURGER: Yes, your Honor.
	11	I'm sorry. Just to make sure for the record, did
	12	we skip 2311? I believe he agreed that that's in, as well.
	13	THE COURT: We did. That would be admitted. Okay.
	14	MS. MARBURGER: So, back okay. We've withdrawn
10:58	15	2319. We withdraw 2323. We withdraw
	16	THE COURT: What about 2321; is that admitted?
	17	MR. VICK: It's admitted.
	18	THE COURT: Okay.
	19	MS. MARBURGER: We withdraw Exhibit 2325. We withdraw
10:58	20	Exhibit well, I'm sorry. Let's start 2342, I believe
	21	Mr. Vick has agreed to allow that.
	22	THE COURT: All right.
	23	MR. VICK: Yes.
	24	MS. MARBURGER: And the same with 2345?
10:59	25	THE COURT: Correct.

10:59	1	MS. MARBURGER: We withdraw Exhibit 2347.
	2	THE COURT: Okay.
	3	MS. MARBURGER: Next is Exhibit 2400. We withdraw
	4	that exhibit. We withdraw 2401. We withdraw 2404, 2405.
10:59	5	THE COURT: Withdrawing that, as well?
	6	MS. MARBURGER: Yes, your Honor.
	7	THE COURT: Okay.
	8	MS. MARBURGER: 2406, 2409, 2412, 2500, 2501, 2502.
	9	And I believe counsel has agreed to 2503.
10:59	10	MR. VICK: Correct.
	11	THE COURT: Is admitted. Okay.
	12	MS. MARBURGER: We withdraw Exhibit 2507 and 2509, as
	13	well as Exhibit 2602, 2605, 2606, 2607, and 2626.
	14	2705 we withdraw, as well as Exhibit 2706, 2709,
11:00	15	2710. 2802 we withdraw, as well as 2804, 2807, 2808, 2811. We
	16	withdraw Exhibit 2900, 2901, 2902.
	17	And I believe counsel has agreed to 2904.
	18	MR. VICK: That's correct.
	19	THE COURT: All right.
11:00	20	MS. MARBURGER: We withdraw Exhibit 2905, 2906, 2907,
	21	2908, and 2909.
	22	THE COURT: All right. What is listed at the bottom
	23	as a potential rebuttal exhibit, that has been admitted. Is
	24	that correct?
11:00	25	MS. MARBURGER: Yes, your Honor.

11:01	1	MR. COURTNEY: Correct, your Honor.
	2	MS. MARBURGER: And I believe, your Honor
	3	MR. COURTNEY: Did we skip these?
	4	MS. MARBURGER: Yeah.
11:01	5	I think if we go back, your Honor, to exhibits
	6	that start with 2000, there was some that counsel and I agreed
	7	to that we didn't discuss originally.
	8	THE COURT: All right. I'm there, I believe.
	9	MS. MARBURGER: Okay. Exhibit 2001, we've agreed to
11:01	10	that exhibit.
	11	THE COURT: Admitted.
	12	MS. MARBURGER: And 2002, we've agreed, 2003, as well
	13	as Exhibit 2300.
	14	THE COURT: Let me get there. All right.
11:01	15	MS. MARBURGER: And then did we cover all these?
	16	THE COURT: What about 2102?
	17	MR. O'ROURKE: That's admitted.
	18	MS. MARBURGER: Yes, your Honor.
	19	THE COURT: Okay. And 2204 would be admitted,
11:01	20	correct?
	21	MR. O'ROURKE: Correct, your Honor.
	22	THE COURT: Okay.
	23	MS. MARBURGER: And then I apologize. I'm not sure
	24	if we went down 2301 yet.
11:01	25	THE COURT: Have not.

11:01	1	MS. MARBURGER: Okay. 2301, I believe counsel has
	2	agreed.
	3	MR. VICK: No objection.
	4	MS. MARBURGER: 2302, 2304, '05, '06.
11:02	5	THE COURT: Yeah, we did those.
	6	MS. MARBURGER: Okay.
	7	THE COURT: How about '09?
	8	MS. MARBURGER: '09?
	9	MR. VICK: No objection to 09.
11:02	10	THE COURT: And '14, 2314?
	11	MR. VICK: I think we went through those and agreed to
	12	them.
	13	MS. MARBURGER: Yes. Yes.
	14	THE COURT: Okay.
11:02	15	MS. MARBURGER: And do you have the same for 2321,
	16	your Honor?
	17	THE COURT: Yes.
	18	MS. MARBURGER: Okay.
	19	THE COURT: Are we there?
11:02	20	MS. MARBURGER: Yes, sir.
	21	MR. VICK: Yes, your Honor.
	22	THE COURT: All right. Then, the remaining
	23	exhibits and let me just say it like this for the record.
	24	For both plaintiff and defendant, the the plaintiff the
11:02	25	fourth amended exhibit list will be the will be the official

11:02	1	record of the exhibits admitted by the Court and/or withdrawn
	2	and for which no objection no additional objections have
	3	been made.
	4	BP's third amended exhibit list will be that
11:03	5	will be the official record representing the exhibits admitted,
	6	reflecting exhibits withdrawn, and as well other other
	7	exhibits that have been admitted or that were admitted today
	8	and are reflected on the record and as well well, I think I
	9	spoke to withdrawn. Yeah. Okay.
11:03	10	MS. MARBURGER: Thank you.
	11	THE COURT: Now, as it relates to the documents,
	12	themselves, that's the next task. And, so, you still need to
	13	get that done; is that right?
	14	MR. O'ROURKE: Well, we have our box ready to go.
11:03	15	MS. MARBURGER: And we do, as well, your Honor.
	16	THE COURT: Okay. Have you-all peeked into each
	17	other's box?
	18	MS. MARBURGER: We have.
	19	MR. O'ROURKE: We've checked back and forth.
11:03	20	MS. MARBURGER: With permission.
	21	THE COURT: All right. You're going to have to sign
	22	in blood that you both have reviewed each of the other's I
	23	think we may have performed something somewhere each other's
	24	exhibits and that you are agreeing that these are the, quote,
11:04	25	exhibits that can go back to the jury.

11:04	1	MS. MARBURGER: Yes.
	2	MR. O'ROURKE: Yes.
	3	THE COURT: All right.
	4	MR. BROWN: Should we come back a little bit before
11:04	5	1:00 in order to just address our objection and tender on the
	6	res ipsa
	7	THE COURT: No. You're going to have to come back a
	8	lot before 1:00.
	9	MR. BROWN: Oh, okay.
11:04	10	THE COURT: Because I've got to either get the
	11	correction in the machine or take your objection on it. And
	12	when I say "a lot," I mean probably, like, 12:30.
	13	MR. BROWN: Sure.
	14	THE COURT: So I'll have at least enough time to make
11:04	15	the correction on the record.
	16	I provide generally to the jurors a copy of the
	17	entire charge so they can read along with me. And they'll have
	18	it for all purposes at that time.
	19	I also will need to get a will have attached
11:05	20	to the back of it a certificate, which is not reflected on your
	21	copies; but it will be reflected on the official original copy
	22	saying, "We the jury make this unanimous verdict."
	23	MR. BUZBEE: Okay. 12:30, your Honor?
	24	THE COURT: 12:30. See you later.
11:05	25	MR. BUZBEE: Okay.

11:05	1	THE COURT: Oh, those who have signed off on the
	2	exhibit list, before you leave, we need to get your signatures.
	3	I'll tell you what, we'll get you at 12:30.
	4	MR. COURTNEY: Judge, should we submit a revised
11:05	5	updated list that's not scratched out or are you okay with the
	6	one
	7	THE COURT: No. I want you to submit a revised. I
	8	mean, if you can get that done, fine. Because the one that you
	9	have that you have given me is quite scratched up. It would be
11:05	10	better if the jury saw just a clean version without my
	11	handwriting on it.
	12	MR. COURTNEY: Okay. Very good.
	13	THE COURT: So, can you get that ready for us by
	14	12:30?
11:06	15	MS. MARBURGER: Yes, your Honor.
	16	MR. COURTNEY: Yes, your Honor.
	17	THE COURT: Okay. Good. Do you plan to submit a
	18	cleaned up or different version back at 12:30, as well?
	19	MR. O'ROURKE: Yeah. We're working on it right now,
11:06	20	your Honor.
	21	THE COURT: Oh, good. All right. I just wanted to
	22	make sure.
	23	(Recess taken from 11:06 to 12:39)
	24	(Jury not present)
12:39	25	THE COURT: Please be seated. Okay. Gentlemen, let

12:39	1	me tell you what I've done in terms of improving what I believe
	2	to be the and placing in what I believe to be the
	3	appropriate language in the in the charge itself on Page 7.
	4	You can read it.
12:40	5	MR. BUZBEE: Your Honor, this phrase "exclusive
	6	management," that's obviously something new and
	7	THE COURT: Yeah. I'm saying that I think to have
	8	control, that might be I added that word.
	9	MR. BUZBEE: I think that's more than what's required.
12:40	10	THE COURT: It may be, and that's why I asked you to
	11	take a look at it. I know that "control" means essentially
	12	that it has to be under its exclusive control, but management
	13	control is certainly enough. I don't know of anybody else who
	14	BP would claim is in charge of their maintenance and preventive
12:40	15	techniques program, let's call it, "techniques" meaning you
	16	talk about it in terms of
	17	MR. BUZBEE: Maintenance and inspections?
	18	THE COURT: Well, there's some instrumentations.
	19	So
12:41	20	MR. BUZBEE: Right.
	21	THE COURT: that needed to be or should have
	22	been in place, as you argued.
	23	MR. BUZBEE: Correct.
	24	THE COURT: And, so, I think you may be right about
12:41	25	the exclusive control exclusive management. I'm sorry.

12:41	1	MR. BUZBEE: Yes, sir. That would be my objection to
	2	this, is I would strike those two words and just leave
	3	"control."
	4	THE COURT: What two words?
12:41	5	MR. BUZBEE: "Exclusive management."
	6	THE COURT: Just say that maintenance was under the
	7	control
	8	MR. BUZBEE: Yes, sir.
	9	THE COURT: of BP?
12:41	10	MR. BUZBEE: Yes, sir.
	11	THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, because "management" might
	12	imply some other duties and responsibilities that are not
	13	there.
	14	All right. Counsel, you indicated you wanted to
12:41	15	look and think about it. You've seen what I've tried to do.
	16	Now tell me what you want to do.
	17	MR. BROWN: Your Honor, we object to the tender of
	18	this instruction. We renew our objection that any instruction
	19	under res ipsa, we contend that it should not be submitted
12:41	20	under Marathon Oil versus Sterner, the 1982 Supreme Court case
	21	we discussed earlier.
	22	THE COURT: All right.
	23	MR. BROWN: Subject to that, we believe that this
	24	specific instruction is not supported by the evidence. There's
12:42	25	no legally or factually sufficient evidence to support it and

12:43

that it improperly shifts the burden of proof to us and is an incorrect statement of the law.

We are particularly concerned about the definition of "control," which almost -- it almost requires them to -- directs them on what answer they need to find. So, we object to this; and we would just tender a very general -- if the Court is going to submit one, we tender to the Court just a general straight Mobil -- Mobil Chemical instruction that was --

THE COURT: Let me read it into the record, then.

What you've tendered as a supplementation to your previous submissions is this; it would say as follows -- you have a copy of it, counsel?

MR. BUZBEE: No.

MR. BROWN: I showed it to him.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to read it, and then you'll hear it anyway.

"You are instructed that you may infer negligence by a party but are not compelled to do so if you find that the character of the accident is such that it would ordinarily not happen in the absence of negligence and if you find that the instrumentality causing the accident was under the management and control of the party at the time of the negligence, if any, causing the accident" -- and it should be "causing the accident probably to occur." I believe you've got to have that "to" in

there. 1 12:43 2 MR. BROWN: Oh, yes. THE COURT: And then the definition of "control" would 3 4 be, "'Control' means the owner must control the mode or method 5 of the contractor's" -- and there's a problem right there --12:43 "contractor's work, and this control must extend to the 6 7 operative detail of the work being performed." 8 I think we're -- you're placing this in someone's 9 hands that is not responsible. And we're saying that somehow the maintenance program, which is what the plaintiffs are 10 12:43 11 complaining about, is under the control of another person. 12 And, of course, we recognize that BP has contracted out its --13 what do you call that program? Startup or --14 MR. BUZBEE: "Turnaround." 12:44 15 THE COURT: Turnaround program. But that's not --16 that is not the object of the plaintiffs' complaint. 17 MR. BUZBEE: Correct. MR. BROWN: Based on that concern, Judge, we would 18 19 tender deleting the word "contractor" so it simply means that 20 the owner must control the mode or method of the work. 12:44 21 THE COURT: Well, what work are we talking about? 22 MR. BROWN: The --23 THE COURT: See, that's the issue that you have. "The 24 mode and method of work," I don't have a problem with those 25 terms; but the mode and method of work is the very argument 12:44

1 that the plaintiffs complain is the preventive techniques; that 12:44 2 is, the instrumentalities that you would put out there, the choice in when you maintain and how you maintain the facility, 3 4 that's what the -- so, the object of the instrumentality 5 problem now is no longer an animate object or -- I'm not saying 12:44 that right -- inanimate -- it's now inanimate. It's a program. 6 7 MR. BROWN: Okay. Well, then perhaps, your Honor, as 8 a final alternate offer, we would simply offer the straight 9 Mobil Chemical instruction with no definition of "control." That would clearly be appropriate under Texas law, and that way 10 12:45 we don't have to worry about any possible error that might come 11 about as a result of the submission of a definition. 12 13 Say that again. You proposed what now? THE COURT: 14 MR. BROWN: Just completely omitting the definition of "control," just leaving that first paragraph, which is the 12:45 15 straight language out of Mobil Chemical. 16 17 MR. BUZBEE: As I said, your Honor, first off, there is -- it is undisputed that the timing and implementation of 18 19 preventive techniques and corrective measures at BP plant was 20 controlled. There's no evidence otherwise. So, as we put in 12:46 our brief, it shouldn't even be in there anyway. But if it's 21 22 going to be in there -- because it's an undisputed fact. If 23 it's going to be in there, then we got to take out this word 24 "exclusive" because --25 THE COURT: Right, I agree with that. But he's --12:46

MR. BUZBEE: I mean, he just keeps arguing these fall-back positions; but the bottom line is, I think, the instruction, if it's going to be in there, is correct if you take out "exclusive." And he continues to fall back and -- you know, I guess like a member of the military.

THE COURT: Well, he wants to take out the definition of "control" where it says, "'Control' means that BP controlled the timing and implementation of any preventive techniques," etcetera.

Certainly, I think that if that's going to stay in there, it needs to change to, "'Control' means that BP must control the timing and implementation of any preventive techniques," as opposed to past tense. I certainly think it needs to be stated in such a way that that's what they must find. In terms of determining these issues, they must determine that control is under BP's — that BP controlled the timing and implementation and not tell them that it is controlled in the past tense.

"'Control' means that BP must control the timing and implementation of any preventive techniques," that's what they need to find -- or utilize that definition. That's the way I think I'll submit it, and your objections -- your objection and submission is refused.

We -- if you want to place this separately there, you can; but it's -- I've read it into the record; and that's

12:47	1	what I am refusing, your res ipsa loquitur proposed
	2	instruction.
	3	MR. BROWN: Okay. I would request that it be tendered
	4	to the clerk for filing with the papers.
12:47	5	THE COURT: All right.
	6	MR. BUZBEE: Do you intend to strike the word
	7	"exclusive," your Honor?
	8	THE COURT: The words that will come the way this
	9	will be worded now, it will say, "was under the control of BP
12:47	10	at the time of the negligence, if any, causing the accident
	11	that probably occurred."
	12	MR. BUZBEE: Okay. We're good with that.
	13	MR. BROWN: "Probably"?
	14	THE COURT: I think I need to say "allegedly."
12:48	15	MR. BROWN: "Allegedly."
	16	THE COURT: Because, again, the other case, there was
	17	no no dispute that an accident had occurred. Okay?
	18	MR. BUZBEE: Yes, sir.
	19	THE COURT: And we will provide you with clean copies
12:48	20	of that, of the charge itself, in just a minute.
	21	(Sotto voce discussion at bench with court staff)
	22	THE COURT: Now let's deal with another matter that I
	23	did not address. The plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment as
	24	a matter of law on the defendant's affirmative defenses. Have
12:49	25	you had a chance to review that? Who will respond to that?

12:49	1	MR. COURTNEY: I guess I can, your Honor.
	2	THE COURT: All right. Here's the affirmative
	3	defenses that are identified by the plaintiff. The second
	4	and if you are looking at their motion, what they call the
12:49	5	second defense is contributory negligence.
	6	MR. COURTNEY: Judge, there is none in this case
	7	THE COURT: On that?
	8	MR. COURTNEY: as a general
	9	THE COURT: Yeah. And an unavoidable accident?
12:49	10	MR. COURTNEY: Same.
	11	THE COURT: And third-party negligence?
	12	MR. COURTNEY: We would submit that this does apply.
	13	There is evidence that the source came from off site as
	14	suggested by the wind data, personal observations from the rail
12:50	15	yard, the wind was from the southeast. And, so, we would stand
	16	by that one, please.
	17	THE COURT: That would be the what number is that?
	18	That's called the fourth
	19	MR. COURTNEY: Third-party negligence.
12:50	20	THE COURT: That's the fourth and fifth defenses,
	21	third-party negligence?
	22	MR. COURTNEY: Correct.
	23	THE COURT: All right. What is called the fourth and
	24	fifth defenses.
12:50	25	And, then, as relates to the 22nd?

12:50	1	MR. COURTNEY: Preexisting conditions, we heard
	2	evidence from at least eight of the plaintiffs that they had
	3	preexisting conditions, including Mr. Fuentes, Munoz,
	4	Jefferson, Mays, Cantu, Pearson, Taylor, and Ms. Claudio. So,
12:50	5	we feel that that one should remain.
	6	THE COURT: And the 23rd is the plaintiffs' released
	7	claims.
	8	MR. COURTNEY: There's no claims
	9	THE COURT: Okay.
12:50	10	MR. COURTNEY: for this trial group, of release.
	11	THE COURT: And 24 is Chapter 95. I'm going to 24
	12	is Chapter 95. I will grant that because I've already done
	13	that in the record.
	14	Now, backing up, 23, plaintiffs' release, that's
12:51	15	granted. I'm sorry. That would be granted, right?
	16	MR. COURTNEY: Of course.
	17	THE COURT: Yeah. And 22 is the preexisting
	18	conditions. I'm going to deny that. That's an argument. When
	19	I say "argument," I'm going to deny their motion to that is,
12:51	20	the defendant's motion to strike that as an argument to be
	21	made.
	22	I don't know that it's an affirmative defense
	23	that you need to prove. It is simply a disputed fact issue as
	24	it relates to whether or not the jury could consider
12:51	25	aggravation and all that kind of thing as opposed to

12:53

preexisting conditions. So, that would be denied as to the defendant's motion -- I'm sorry, the plaintiffs' motion.

Backing up now to the fourth and fifth, having to do with third-party negligence, I think that in terms of the plaintiffs' affirmative duty, the plaintiff has to -- and I don't want to say this as a matter of law. I want to say it as a matter of appreciation.

I think the plaintiff has to eliminate the possibility or at least make the possibility of a third-party liability issue go away; in other words, this did not come from off site, it came on -- it came on the plant or was on the plant or was permitted on the plant as a result of lack of maintenance.

So, the, quote, release or whatever it was that created this odor event, I'm not sure there's any evidence from the defense, if this is an affirmative defense, that it came off site. That's the problem I have with granting it and denying it.

MR. TAAFFE: Yeah, your Honor. I'd just say we've heard extensively about their claim that it came from off site, but I haven't heard a shred of evidence that they've identified some other third-party's negligence that caused this alleged offsite --

THE COURT: Right. And you can argue that it came off site, without having the burden of proving, because it seemed

12:53	1	to me that when you argue that as an affirmative defense you've
	2	got to produce a preponderance of the evidence to show that
	3	there was, in fact, either an identifiable source or that you
	4	eliminate that it was on your site. Now, you haven't
12:53	5	eliminated it except by testimony, just as they haven't
	6	eliminated off site except by testimony. So, it's a
	7	credibility issue.
	8	Now, what does that mean? That means for the
	9	fourth and fifth, I'm going to deny them as affirmative
12:54	10	defenses. In other words, I'm granting their motion. But that
	11	doesn't prevent you from arguing that somebody else caused
	12	this.
	13	Okay? All right. I think I got it right. Thank
	14	you, gentlemen.
12:54	15	MR. TAAFFE: Thank you.
	16	MR. COURTNEY: Thank you.
	17	THE COURT: Did you file this motion this morning, or
	18	did you just hand it to me?
	19	MR. TAAFFE: This is the motion for judgment as a
12:54	20	matter of law?
	21	THE COURT: Right.
	22	MR. TAAFFE: That was filed last night by E-filing.
	23	THE COURT: Last night. All I'll need to give you is
	24	the order, then.
12:54	25	Well, we've got about five minutes. And we'll

12:54	1	get those jury charges in and place them on the jurors' seats,
	2	and then we'll be ready to go. If there's nothing else who
	3	is going to be arguing for the plaintiff?
	4	MR. BUZBEE: That would be me.
12:54	5	THE COURT: All right. And who is arguing for the
	6	defense?
	7	MR. BROWN: Mr. Galbraith.
	8	THE COURT: Okay. He'll be coming shortly.
	9	All right. I think we're on the same page.
12:54	10	Argument, one hour each; and then you'll get a 10 minute
	11	rebuttal, at most.
	12	MR. BUZBEE: Excellent. Thank you.
	13	(Judge leaves bench briefly)
	14	THE COURT: Remain standing. The jury is on its way
01:03	15	in.
	16	(Jury present)
	17	THE COURT: All right. Please be seated.
	18	Well, good afternoon, ladies.
	19	THE JURORS: (In unison) Hello.
01:04	20	THE COURT: I sure hope you-all had a good lunch.
	21	THE JURORS: (In unison) We did.
	22	THE COURT: Great. We are now ready. We're down to
	23	that portion of the case that involves a little bit more
	24	attention directed attention from you.
01:04	25	I'll be reading what you have in your hands,

called the "Instructions to the Jury." You certainly can follow along. You can take those back with you so that as you get into your discussions and deliberations you don't need to look over each others' shoulders to discuss various aspects of the case. However, the answers to the interrogatories that are attached to that are to be made on the original. And I have the original here, which will go back with you. Now, when I say "go back with you," it will go along with the exhibits that have been admitted.

And what you will find is two exhibit lists that have -- both having excluded a lot of documents that are no longer a part of the offer by the plaintiffs or the defendants. And, so, you'll have those two lists so that you might find those exhibits in the exhibit boxes, in the boxes that we will also have delivered back to you. So, you'll have your instructions, you'll have the exhibits, and you'll have the exhibit list.

And just as a friendly reminder, we will not be able to bring to you, provide to you the testimony of any witnesses. You're going to have to rely upon your collective recollections as to what was said and how it was said or what was done. So, that credibility issue becomes one that must be a part of your discussions.

So, when you are back -- and I'm not suggesting that you will. But if you come to some point where there is a

serious dispute as to what a particular person said, if it's specifically identifiable in a way that we can find it in the record, we'll go look for it. But we don't have printed copies of the record to hand to you for you to read and go back through the testimony, because that would not be an appropriate way to present the evidence to you in this case.

Let's see. Is there anything else I need to say before I get started?

Let's see. The closing arguments, the time allocated for counsel for plaintiff and defendant is one hour each with plaintiff having a 10 minute -- at most, 10 minute rebuttal.

I think the better way to do this, so that we don't look at two and a half hours of sitting -- or two hours and so-many minutes of sitting, is we will take about a 10 minute break at the end of the plaintiffs' presentation, stretch your legs, walk around, and then we'll go to the defendant's and we'll take all of that plus the plaintiffs' rebuttal, and then you'll be retired to the jury room for deliberations.

All right. I think we're ready to get started, and I will start, myself, by reading the charge to you. The lawyers have copies of this. And if you see typographical errors, blame it on me. If you see -- if I make a mistake in reading, blame it on me.

And the reason I give it to you is because you'll be able to do your own perfect reading yourself if I misstate something. Sometimes I -- having done this for so many years, I'll say things that I've seen so many times and perhaps they're in this and perhaps they're not. But just watch me carefully as I go through.

All right. Ladies, you have heard the evidence in this case. I will now instruct you on the law that you must apply. It is your duty to follow the law as I give it to you. On the other hand, you the jury are the judges of the facts. Do not consider any statements that I have made during the course of the trial or made in these instructions as an indication that I have any opinion about the facts of this case.

After I instruct you on the law, the attorneys will have an opportunity to make their closing arguments.

Statements and arguments of the attorneys are not evidence and are not instructions on the law. They are intended only to assist the jury in understanding the evidence and the parties' contentions.

Answer each question from the facts as you find them. Do not decide who you think should win and then answer the questions accordingly. Your answers and your verdict must be unanimous.

Do not let bias, prejudice, or sympathy play any

01:09

part in your deliberations. A corporation and all other persons are equal before the law and must be treated as equals in a court of justice.

You must answer all questions by a preponderance of the evidence. By this is meant the greater weight and degree of credible evidence before you. In other words, a preponderance of the evidence just means the amount of evidence that persuades you that a claim is more likely so than not so. In determining whether any fact has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence in the case, you may, unless otherwise instructed, consider the testimony of all witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all exhibits and evidence, regardless of who may have produced them.

The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to prove any fact even if a greater number of witnesses may have testified to the contrary if, after considering all other evidence, you believe that single witness.

In determining the weight to give to the testimony of a witness, you should ask yourselves whether there was evidence tending to prove that the witness falsely testified concerning some important fact or whether there was evidence that at some other time the witness said or did something or failed to say or do something that was different from the testimony the witness gave before you during the

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trial.

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A witness may be discredited or "impeached" by contradictory evidence, by showing that he or she testified falsely concerning a material matter or by evidence that at some other time the witness has said or done something or has failed to say or do something which is inconsistent with the witness' present testimony. If you believe that any witness has been so impeached, then it is your exclusive province to give the testimony of that witness such credibility or weight, if any, as you think -- or may think it deserves.

You should keep in mind, of course, that a single mistake by a witness does not necessarily mean that the witness was not telling the truth as he or she remembers it, because people may forget some things or remember other things inaccurately. So, if a witness has made a misstatement, you need to consider whether that misstatement was an intentional falsehood or simply an innocent lapse of memory; and the significance of that may depend on whether it has to do with an important fact or with only an unimportant detail.

Now, while you should consider only the evidence in this case, you are permitted to draw such reasonable inferences from the testimony and exhibits as you feel are justified in the light of common experience. In other words, you may make deductions and reach conclusions that reason and common sense leads you to draw from the facts that have been

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established by the testimony and evidence in the case.

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There are two types of evidence that you may consider in properly finding the truth as to the facts in the case. One is direct evidence, such as the testimony of an eyewitness. The other is indirect or circumstantial evidence, the proof of a chain of circumstances that indicates the existence or nonexistent of certain other facts. As a general rule, the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence but simply requires that you find the facts from the preponderance of all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial.

Now, when you retire to the jury room to deliberate on your verdict, you may take this charge with you as well as exhibits which the Court has admitted into evidence. Select your foreperson and conduct your deliberations. If you recess during your deliberations, follow all of the instructions that the Court has given to you about/on your conduct during the trial.

After you have reached your unanimous verdict, your foreperson is to fill in on the form your answers to the questions. Do not reveal your answers until such time as you are discharged, unless otherwise directed by me. You must never disclose to anyone, not even me, your numerical division on any question.

Now, just as a matter of point at this juncture,

there may be -- and I have not checked, but we'll check to see. There may be question forms in the jury room for you. If they're not there, we will certainly make sure there is a form for -- or paperwork for you -- for the foreperson to raise a question.

If there is a question that you need me to answer, then I will be -- the case manager will be bringing that to me, or the marshal or the court security officer will bring that to me. So, we'll make sure we've got some paper in there for that question, if any question arises.

If you want to communicate with me at any time, please write a written message or question to the bailiffs, who will bring it to me. I will then respond as promptly as possible either in writing or by having you brought into the courtroom so that I can address you orally. I will always first disclose to the attorneys your question and my response before I answer your question.

After you reach a verdict, you're not required to talk with anyone about the case, unless the Court, I should say, directs or orders otherwise.

Section II deals with the contentions of the parties.

In this case, the plaintiff claims -- the plaintiffs claim that, in the evening hours of April 19, 2007, while working in the BP Pipestill 3B and Cat 1 Units, they were

exposed to toxic substances. They claim to have experienced various symptoms that required medical evaluation and/or treatment. In this regard, the plaintiff claims that BP was negligent in failing to maintain a safe workplace due to poor maintenance.

The plaintiffs assert that the equipment is old and unreliable and that BP's maintenance program reacts to breakdowns as opposed to proactively addressing them. Hence, there have been numerous releases and spills of toxic substances at the BP facility before and since April 19th, 2007.

The plaintiffs also assert that BP did not have sufficient monitoring systems in place to detect a release of toxic substances, to warn workers of a release, and to timely evacuate them from the premises. Those are the plaintiffs' contentions.

The defendant, BP, claims that it did not release a toxic substance on the evening of April 19th, 2007. BP disputes that the plaintiffs sustained disabling injuries as a result of its conduct. Moreover, BP claims that there is no evidence that the plaintiffs were exposed to any substance in excess of the applicable permissible exposure limits established by OSHA.

Finally, BP claims, (a), it was not in control of any instrumentality that caused the odor event of April 19th,

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2007; (b), there's no evidence that the alleged unidentified cause of the odor was under control of BP; (c), the cause of the odor event was due to the negligence of a third party over whom BP had no control; and (d), the plaintiffs' injuries, if any, were preexisting and not proximately caused by the odor event of April 19th; and, (e), the odor event was the result of an unavoidable accident. These are BP's contentions.

Because corporations are not natural persons, they act through agents, employees, and servants. Therefore, acts of negligence committed by BP's agents, employees, and servants, that arose out of or done in conducting BP's business and done in the course and scope of that relationship binds BP. Hence, the negligence of BP, if any, may be due to acts of any such agent, employee, or servant of BP.

"Definitions." The Rules of Evidence provide that -- it should be "if" -- that if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge might assist you in understanding -- in the understanding of the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify and state his or her opinion concerning such matters.

You should consider each expert opinion received in this case and give it such weight as you may think it deserves. If you should decide that the opinion of an expert witness is not based on sufficient education and experience or

if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinion are not sound or that the opinion is outweighed by other evidence, then you may disregard that opinion entirely.

"Proximate cause" means that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces an event and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using ordinary care would have foreseen that the event or some similar event might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

"Negligence" is a failure to use ordinary care; that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

Gross negligence. The plaintiff also claims that the defendant was grossly negligent. To prevail on this claim, the plaintiff must prove that BP was grossly negligent by clear and convincing evidence.

Now, you notice earlier I used the term "preponderance of the evidence" having to do with one standard

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of proof. "Gross negligence" requires a different standard of proof, and that's what I am referring to here.

"Clear and convincing evidence" is the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.

"Gross negligence" must be viewed objectively from the standpoint of BP, the act or omission must involve an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and BP must have actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved but, nevertheless, proceed in conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of the plaintiffs.

Compensatory damages. If you find that BP is liable to the plaintiffs, then you must determine an amount that is fair compensation for all of the plaintiffs' damages. These damages are called "compensatory damages." The purpose of compensatory damages is to make the plaintiffs whole; that is, to compensate the plaintiffs for the damages the plaintiffs have suffered.

Compensatory damages are not limited to expenses that the plaintiff may have incurred because of the injury. If the plaintiffs prevail, they're entitled to compensatory damages for the physical injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish that they have suffered because of BP's conduct. The plaintiffs' claims -- the plaintiffs claim damages of past

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physical pain, mental anguish, loss of earnings, and medical expenses.

Of course, the fact that I give you instructions concerning the issue of damages should not be interpreted in any way as an indication that I believe that the plaintiffs should or should not prevail in the case. You may award compensatory damages only for injuries that the plaintiffs have proved were proximately caused by BP's allegedly wrongful conduct.

The damages that you award must be fair compensation for all of the plaintiffs' damages, no more or less. You should not award compensatory damages for speculative -- speculative injuries but only those injuries which the plaintiffs have actually suffered or that the plaintiffs are reasonably likely to suffer in the future.

If you decide to award compensatory damages, you should be guided by dispassionate common sense. Computing damages may be difficult, but you must not let that difficulty in such calculations lead you to engage in arbitrary guesswork. On the other hand, the law does not require the plaintiff to prove the amount of his or her losses with mathematical precision but only with as much definiteness and accuracy as the circumstances permit.

You may award damages for any injury or illness that any plaintiff suffered before the date of his -- you may

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not -- I'm sorry.

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You may not award damages for any injury or illness that any plaintiff suffered before the date of his or her alleged injury or accident, should I say, on April 19, 2007. However, you may award damages for aggravation of an existing physical defect or activation of any such latent condition resulting from physical injury to any plaintiff.

If you find that -- if you find that there was such an aggravation, you must determine, if you can, what portion of a plaintiff's condition resulted from the aggravation and make allowance in your verdict only for that aggravation.

And the next and final section is "Interrogatories."

You're instructed that you may infer negligence by BP but not -- are not compelled to do so, if you find, (a), that the character of the accident is such that it would not ordinarily -- would ordinarily not happen in the absence of negligence; and, (b), that the cause of the accident -- i.e., BP's failure to implement preventive techniques and corrective measures in its maintenance program -- was under the control of BP at the time of the -- at the time the negligence, if any, causing the accident that allegedly occurred.

"Control" means that BP must control the timing and implementation of any preventive techniques and corrective

1 measures at its facility. 01:22 2 You'll answer the following interrogatories. And 3 Interrogatory Number 1 inquires: Was there an escape, spill, 4 release, or leak of a toxic substance at the BP facility on the occasion in question, due to the negligence of BP, its agents, 5 01:22 employees, or servants? 6 7 You'll answer that "yes" or "no," and a line is 8 provided for your answer. 9 Now, if you answer "yes" to Interrogatory Number 1, then answer Interrogatory Number 2: Was such 10 01:22 11 negligence, if you have so found in Interrogatory Number 1, a 12 proximate cause of the injuries, if any, that you found -- that you found that any plaintiff suffered? 13 14 You'll answer that "yes" or "no" as to each 01:23 15 plaintiff, if any, that you have found sustained an injury. 16 And lines are provided for your answers as to each plaintiff. 17 You'll answer those "yes" or "no," and lines are provided. If you've answered "yes" to Interrogatory 18 19 Number 2 as to any plaintiff, and only in that event, answer the following interrogatory: What compensatory damages -- and 20 01:23 we defined that earlier -- if any, do you find as to each 21 22 plaintiff for whom you answered "yes" in Interrogatory 23 Number 2? You'll answer in dollars and cents, if any. 24 25 Lines are provided for your answers. 01:23

By way of example, Number 1, Gilberto Cantu, you see lines for Mental Anguish/Pain and Suffering, past medical expenses, lost income. That same or those same claims are being made by all of the plaintiffs except Edwin Munoz, Number 8. So, 1 through 7, the same claims are being made. Edwin Munoz is asking for, additionally, future medical expenses; and that's the distinction between Mr. Munoz and the others.

Lines are provided for your answers as to each of those if you are led to those by your answers.

If you have answered Interrogatory Number 3 as to any plaintiff, and only in that event, then answer the following interrogatory.

This deals with punitive damages.

You may also award punitive damages if the plaintiff, or any plaintiff, for that matter, has proven that BP acted with gross negligence, with malice, or with willfulness, or with callous and reckless indifference for the safety or rights of others.

One acts willfully or with reckless indifference for the rights of others when he acts in disregard of a high and excessive degree of danger about which he knows or would have -- or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in his position.

If you determine that BP's conduct was so

shocking and offensive as to justify an award of punitive damages, you must exercise your discretion to award those damages. In making any award of punitive damages, you should be -- you should consider -- I'm sorry, I'm getting tired -- that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish a defendant for shocking conduct and to deter that defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future.

The law does not require you to award punitive damages. However, if you decide to award punitive damages, you must use sound reason in setting the amount of the damages. The amount of the award of punitive damages must not reflect bias, prejudice, or sympathy toward any party. However, the amount can be as large as you believe necessary to fulfill the purposes of punitive damages.

Interrogatory Number 4 inquires: What damages, if any, do you award as punitive damages against BP?

And a line is provided as relates to each of the plaintiffs, assuming that you make that choice.

The jurors certificate. We the jury have answered the above and foregoing questions as herein indicated and herewith return our unanimous verdict into court, to be signed by the jury foreperson.

I have the original. As I indicated earlier, we'll make sure this original gets back. The answers are to be recorded on the original.

All right. Ladies and gentlemen, we're now ready 1 01:26 2 to start with the closing arguments; and we'll start with the 3 plaintiff. 4 Counsel, you may proceed. 5 MR. BUZBEE: Yes, your Honor. May it please the 01:26 6 Court. 7 THE COURT: Yes. 8 MR. BUZBEE: Ladies of the jury, I know it's been a 9 long three weeks. I promised you at the beginning that I would move it as quickly as I could, and I tried to do that. 10 01:26 11 But I've got to go back to this. This case is 12 about responsibility, and that's not just a word. We use it a 13 I use it with my four kids a lot, "responsibility." And 14 "Kids of Character," you've probably heard of all that, talking about responsibility all the time. But I think we use that 01:27 15 16 word so much that we sometimes forget what it really means. 17 It means being morally, legally, or mentally accountable for your actions. And what we have here in this 18 19 case is a defendant, a company, that simply will not take 20 responsibility for its own actions. 01:27 21 This -- and, you know, I put up these damages. 22 And every time I put up these small amount of medical damages I 23 cringe a little bit because my thought was maybe you were thinking, "Well, wait a minute, Tony. I just got ripped out of 24 25 my life for three weeks to come down here and sit through a lot 01:27

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of stuff that's boring, a lot of things that were aggravating,"

I'm sure, to you. You were kept out of a lot of the

discussions that happened over there.

And every time I wrote down 1200 bucks or 900 bucks, I was thinking what must you be thinking. Maybe you're thinking, "This is a complete waste of my time." But I hope, now that we've done this for three weeks, that you see that this, indeed, is the most important case that will be tried this year in this state. The most important case.

Before I talk about the facts, I need to talk about this -- this Latin phrase, "res ipsa loquitur." Now, one of you is going to be the foreperson of this jury; and I hope that whoever that is remembers, on Page 7 of the -- and that's where it starts "Interrogatories" -- the judge instructs you on res ipsa loquitur.

What it means is, we learned in law school, "the thing speaks for itself." In other words, if BP controlled the timing of their maintenance program and if this event was the type that normally would not happen but for the lack of maintenance, then the plaintiffs win the case. And the law recognizes that it's inherently unfair for someone who is outside looking in, who has no access to the plant, to be able to tell you where that leak came from. The law doesn't require us to do that.

We tried to do that, and they've taken potshots

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at us all week. They didn't like the way we did our mask; they didn't like this; they didn't like that. But the fact is we tried to show you where carbon disulfide would come from. And I think, more likely than not, we clearly did that.

But even if you say, "You know what, Tony? I don't like the fact that the mask sat in your offices for three weeks" or "I don't like the fact that one of your lawyers, Kyle Smith, somehow the box got busted and, so, therefore, you haven't proven to me with mathematical certainty," which you saw we're not required to do, "that that's carbon disulfide," I would submit to you this: res ipsa loquitur. It means if this is the type of event that normally does not happen with negligence -- without negligence -- in other words, we know releases don't happen but for negligence, bottom line -because the number one rule is what? Keep it in the pipes. How many times did you hear that -- and we know that BP has complete control over their facility and it's, in fact, their duty and responsibility morally, ethically, and legally to do maintenance, then we win, whether you think it's the SRU, which I believe it clearly was, or whether you think they were using some sort of carbon disulfide industrial solvent to -- and didn't properly clear it all out before these contractors went in there. That's the -- that's why Page 7 is what I would like you to focus on, res ipsa. You won't see the Latin phrase, but that's what it is, something that we talk about in law school.

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Now, the burden of proof. This is the oldest court, the oldest federal court in the State of Texas. I bet you didn't know that. This is the oldest federal court. When Texas became a part of the United States, it wasn't -- wasn't located here but it was located in Galveston. And this is the oldest court that has ever existed in the State of Texas.

And one cool thing about this court -- and I have tried 20 or 30 cases in this court -- is, if you look up at the lights -- see the lights? Those are patterned after the scales of justice. It's a real cool feature. And one of the judges that was here, you know, he did spend a lot of time trying to give a nod to history and a nod to the fact that, you know, these courtrooms mean something.

To me it's -- for my profession, it's almost a church, because this is the great equalizer. This is a place where if you get too big to be regulated by the State or by the federal government you can still be regulated by eight people yanked out of their lives to hear facts.

But I want you to remember this: The burden of proof is, is it more likely than not. Basically, as the judge said, if you believe that we have shown you that it's more likely than not, that we have tipped the scale in favor of these plaintiffs, we win the case. It's mandated if you believe that.

So, the question you're going to have to ask was

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BP negligent, and the answer, I submit to you, is going to be, yes.

And are the plaintiffs entitled to damages; and I submit to you again, it's more likely than not, yes, they're entitled to damages.

Now, BP, they're a convicted felon. We know this. We spent a lot of time about their background. Why do we talk about background? As anybody that's been in, for instance, the teaching profession knows, there are people that can turn the corner. We know that. People can change. But if you want to know where someone is going, you look at where they've been.

They've got -- they're a convicted felon for lack of maintenance and inspections. Forty-six illegal pollutant emissions. OSHA has fined them and cited them over 600 times, 400 times in September, for the exact same thing we're here to talk about, failure to keep it in the pipes, failure to inspect, failure to maintain. We heard that they were -- they were over a thousand inspections behind, seven years behind. By 2005 they were seven years behind in their maintenance.

Now, you're saying, "Well, okay. So what?"

Well, I submit to you that -- that you don't make that up in two years when you're seven years behind. And that is a conscious disregard for the safety of not only BP's own employees but these contractors that come in here and do this

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work at their plant.

They have the worst process safety management record in the history of the United States, of keeping it in the pipes; and they're the biggest polluter in the United States. There's been over 500 releases, emissions, spills, and leaks.

Remember -- remember Fire Chief McLemore? A fire a week? And they tried to sugar coat that a little bit.

Remember? And he was doing his best, but you could tell his heart really wasn't in it. He was done. He got his retirement. But the truth is -- I showed you his deposition where he admitted a couple years ago that they had one fire a week.

Think about that. One fire a week, does that sound like someplace safe to work? That sounds like a place that is a disaster waiting to happen.

They average 200 leaks a year. And 70 percent of the time that someone is made sick by an odor, they don't find the source. I mean, if you got a plant where you're making people sick out there and you can't find the source, what does that tell you? That tells you that you are doing something wrong.

And let me tell you something. I don't attack chemical companies. I mean, they obviously have their place. I drive cars. I use gas. These people, this company is an

anomaly. They're not like everyone else. They're the worst.

They can do this safely. It can be done the right way, but they don't do it the right way. The lack of maintenance and inspections leads to leaks, spills, and releases. I mean, it just goes on and on.

Now, we're talking about chemicals. You know, I was concerned in the case that -- we were talking about these odors, and there's something to say -- we can talk about a smell or it stinks, and we know what that is. But we're talking about smells that make people sick or make people pass out or make people throw up blood or make people have to use a breathing machine for a couple of months. That's what I am talking about.

It's a lot worse than simply a foul smell. We're talking about corrosive, reactive, explosive, flammable; and we're talking about pollutants. I mean, this is -- we live here. This is where we live. This is our good neighbor that's polluting our air, our ground, and our water.

I'm going to run through these quickly because you've seen it about four times. Ninety-five leaks in a six-month period; one hundred five leaks in that six-month period. One hundred twenty-six leaks.

And do you also notice that Pipestill 3B, which is supposed to be de-inventoried and have nothing in it, they're still having leaks there? Anyone with common sense

knows if it's de-inventoried, they cleaned it out, they flushed it out, they vacuumed it, all this stuff they claim they did before the contractors went in. Then why is it still having leaks?

January 1 up until -- or the six-month period that this incident occurred, 162 leaks. Now, did you notice that they came in and they tried to minimize that and tried to say, "Well, every leak doesn't mean somebody got sick or that there was pollution or that it was illegal"? Every leak means they violated Rule Number 1.

And granted, I mean, if we wanted to stay here for six months, which I gathered you guys didn't want to do, we could have went through every leak. We could have done that and we could have put BP to task and we could have said, "Okay, BP. See, that's a major leak, that's a major leak."

But did they bring you a document that says that none of these were major leaks? Of course, not. All they brought you was a bunch of talk. They didn't bring you anything to look at or to hold or to read.

BP also -- not only do they have all these leaks and spills and releases, they also don't investigate them. You remember what the worker said? Remember that little survey that I went over with Chief McLemore? Remember one of the things the worker said was "no one looks at Traction."

Remember Traction was supposed to be this real

important thing that everybody looked at and followed because it was logged? No one looks at it.

"No inspections," "there's not enough inspections," "not enough money spent on maintenance," "we're understaffed," these are their own workers saying it. I mean, one way you can look at this is to blame the BP workers. And I think that's an unfair way to look at it, personally. I think that's a management problem.

And it's probably not even the man from League City, the plant manager. It's probably a management problem over in London because they simply don't want to spend the money to make the plant safe.

Remember this whole idea of "clamp on top of clamp on top of clamp"? It's basically putting a Band-Aid over a Band-Aid over a Band-Aid. They don't do proper investigation of incidents. And we know, all the while this is going on, they're making \$130 million of profit a month. That's what we know.

Here is just a list of various instances simply not investigated. I mean, the releases listed? And they don't spend a minute investigating. If that is not -- does not shock your conscience, I don't think I can shock your conscience. It's going to take a much better lawyer than me to shock your conscience. If you look at that and you see the 350,000 gallons of hydrocarbon that was spilled out there and

there was not -- beyond that one piece of paper, there's no 1 01:38 2 investigation, I can't shock your conscience. 3 And, then, odor events, what BP calls "odor 4 events." This is the first -- I never heard that phrase 5 before, "odor event," until I started looking at this case. 01:38 This is what BP calls when somebody gets sick, and it goes into 6 7 Traction, "That's an odor event." We all know that means that 8 somebody got exposed to a chemical. Seventy percent of the 9 time, they don't investigate it. Seventy percent of the time they don't find out what it was. 10 01:38 11 Why would they do that? Because if they find out 12 what it is they have to report it. That's a fact. And, so, 13 what we have is -- I made this nifty little graph -- is 14 70 percent of the time, they don't source it, they don't report 01:39 15 it. Now, that is actually a picture of the 16 17 pipestills. Never did a good job of showing you that, but 18 that's what it is. You can see the towers, but you can also 19 see that that area is very -- you know, we talked about whether it's a confined area or not a confined area. Anybody with 20 01:39 common sense can see that's a confined area. It's not a 21 22 football field. There's a bunch of equipment out there. 23 The SRU Unit, we know that the SRU Unit is a --24 A JUROR: (Indicating). 25 MR. BUZBEE: I'm sorry. I keep trying to --01:39

A JUROR: I can't stand this. 1 01:39 2 MR. BUZBEE: I know. I'm sorry about that. This 3 thing right here, I'm looking at --4 THE COURT: You can let those arms down. I think they 5 will let down. They should release. 01:39 6 MR. BUZBEE: All right. Maybe that's better. 7 THE COURT: Same with those arms there. 8 MR. BUZBEE: Sorry. 9 Okay. Let's talk about the SRU Unit. You heard the SRU Unit has carbon disulfide. But the whole argument is 10 01:40 11 this, "Well, yes, Tony, it has carbon disulfide. But if it 12 leaked carbon disulfide, it would have leaked hydrogen sulfide; 13 so, it would have killed everybody." I mean, that's their 14 argument, right? 01:40 15 But that's when the SRU Unit is functioning 16 properly. Now, how many times do we know that it wasn't 17 functioning properly? How many times do we know that there -remember I got that anonymous call, that they squalled about 18 19 because I was asking some of the witnesses about it? The 20 anonymous caller was right. It took me a couple of questions 01:40 to get the guy from Cherry Point to admit that there was, in 21 22 fact, a problem with the seal. Now, they didn't replace the 23 seal; but there was a problem, and it was leaking. 24 And you heard the evidence that there was an 25 announcement that the SRU has been fixed and it was, like, a 01:40

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wave of relief because the SRU had been acting up and causing problems. But it wasn't the only time it had been acting up. There had been 50 total events at the SRU Unit. And one -- in a seven year period, they -- they leaked 407,000 pounds of sulfur dioxide and 7,000 pounds of hydrogen sulfide from that one SRU Unit that is, literally, less than 30 miles from this courthouse.

The SRU Unit, we talked about the ratios. We know that it routinely malfunctions. And we had to reach an agreement on what "malfunction" means, it doesn't operate properly. We know that the seal was, in fact, repaired. And we also know one thing about carbon disulfide: It evaporates very easily and the vapor can collect on top of the pool.

And, so, carbon disulfide will evaporate and become a vapor; and then it can get leaked. And it can get leaked from high up. And it's heavier than air, and it can rain down on people in vapor form; and that's exactly what happened here. And anybody that has common sense knows that's probably what happened here.

Let's talk about this -- look at that quote there. "There is no shame in not knowing. The shame lies in not finding out." We know that in the days leading up to this release, March 21st -- let's skip that because that's not close enough in time. Let's start with January 22nd. Workers were overcome by a chemical, causing nausea and sore throat.

Then April 12th, five days before the incident, workers were -- worker was overcome by a chemical, causing nausea. And then we see on April 19th, literally 20 hours before this event, that five workers -- now, you-all remember Paula Jowell? Remember her? She was early on in the case, and a lot has happened.

But I was thinking, in my view, she was probably one of the most powerful witnesses because you -- she didn't have any experience with plants. You can tell. She was out there picking up trash. But you could see she was terrified when she had been gassed the night before and then, when it happened again and she -- remember, her statement is in evidence, you-all can look at it. She came out of the Pipestill 3B Unit; and she said people were just strung everywhere, people were sick everywhere, people were throwing up, people were passing out, people were dizzy. This was an odor event according to BP.

And you heard Chief McLemore. Remember what he said? I said, "Chief, if there was an incident 20 hours before that caused five people to get sick, would you have sent them right back in there?" And remember I said, "That would be ridiculous, wouldn't it?"

And he said, "Yes." That's the fire chief.

Now, granted, he didn't know anything about it;
but we know that that unit, Pipestill 3B, because of caustic

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odors making people sick, was evacuated more than 17 times during this turnaround. That is a workplace that's unsafe.

Now, it's one thing to tell these workers, "Hey, look here, workers, you're going to get gassed. Here's you a mask you can wear, and you can wear it all the time." That's one thing. It's quite another to say, "No. We have a safe workplace," and then repeatedly make people sick and then stick your head in the sand like an ostrich and pretend like you don't know what it was and you're not going to find out.

We know there was overwhelming evidence of a release that caused five workers to get sick 20 hours prior and BP did nothing. They were out of that unit for about two hours and then, without finding the source, without setting up any kind of monitoring, without taking any precautions whatsoever, they sent them right back in there. None of the prior incidents that I just showed you were investigated. The blind cannot see. The arrogant will not see.

Now, we know for a fact that 110 people went to the hospital. And despite what their last expert said, we know that they weren't light hearted. We know they were throwing up. We had — one guy said he threw up blood. We talked about two people, at least, that had to have breathing treatments. We had two people, at least, that passed out. We had eyes burning, throwing up — I mean, everything you can imagine. And if you put it in the context of getting gassed with

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something, it will scare the devil out of you. It will scare the devil out of you.

You know, in the Marines -- we talked about it a little bit in the opening statements. They used to gas us purposely so we -- you probably -- now you know why I'm screwed up like I am. They used to gas us purposely. They'd take us into a gas chamber, with a mask on; and the idea was to teach you how important the mask was.

So, you would be in there; and they would gases you. All right? And then you would have to take your mask off and then do exercises. And then you would run out; and you would be sick, and you would be this and that. But we knew what we had been gassed with, and we knew that it wouldn't hurt you. And the idea was to teach -- but it was still scary. It was very scary.

So, imagine when you're at work or these workers are at work and they're just all of the sudden vapored and gassed and they see people passing out and throwing up and there's ambulances coming and then no one will tell them what it is. We know that some people passed out, some people threw up blood, a hundred and eighty-nine people reported the odor.

BP has a long history of this conduct.

The smell -- their own expert said that the smell and the symptoms were consistent with carbon disulfide, and we know that carbon disulfide was found on the mask. And even

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their \$400,000 expert, I made him admit you cannot rule out carbon disulfide.

Remember they -- at the beginning -- I don't know if you remember Mr. Galbraith's opening statement. He promised a lot. Boy, he promised a lot. He didn't prove anything. He didn't prove anything. Their own expert says you can't rule out carbon disulfide.

This is their rigorous investigations. I really wish you would, if you feel compelled, look at Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2, the investigative report. Read that. When you read it, you'll, just like I do, pick out every inconsistency and every falsehood that we know the evidence does not support. There was no mention of passing out, no mention of dead birds, no mention of -- you're going to see all these statements where people saw other people foaming at the mouth -- remember the guy flopping like a fish? Remember that? When Mr. Galbraith said, "Well, you said nobody passed out" -- I'm sorry. I said "flopping like a fish." I -- semantics. Sorry about that -- vomiting.

And if you look at it, you can see lawyers -lawyers all over that document. It was written by lawyers. It
was what you would call a prophylactic measure. It's somebody
protecting themselves. It's somebody circling the wagons.

Because this event was reported in all the newspapers, that
they had -- you look in the investigative report, by 23:00,

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11:00 o'clock or so, the press was at the hospitals; and then they came to the front gate.

They were circling the wagons already. It was a big deal. And that's why this investigative report was written by lawyers. And you can tell. If you read it, you'll see it was written by lawyers. It was written very carefully. And they left out a lot of key facts. Specifically the SRU seal, they left that out, conveniently.

Where is the pressure data from the SRU Unit?

It's not in there. Now, the Cherry Point guy said he'd seen it. But have we seen it? No, not ever produced it.

The pressure data, they produced pressure data from Cat 3, which shows pressure drop. Remember we looked at that? But they didn't produce the data from the SRU Unit for some reason. There's no mention of all the previous incidents. There's no mention of the subsequent incidents that happened later.

They say in there that CTEH was on the scene within hours. We know that's not true at all. It was 25 hours later. Now, you may say: Tony, you're hedging words. You're not" -- no, no. When you read the way it's written, it makes it seem like that these guys were on call and they were on the site, when they actually came a day later, when all the gas was gone and most of the people had already been released from the hospital.

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And they say that BP was going up as the workers were coming down. Well, that was physically impossible. Now, do I have a problem with Darwin Perren? No. That guy was in between a rock and a hard -- remember the guy on Friday last week? When he walked out of here, he looked -- if looks could kill, he would have killed me. No doubt about it.

But the truth is, by the time he got out there -and whether you believe he knew how to use the monitor or
not -- I read the manual, but one thing I understand is people
out in the field know more than some silly lawyer reading a
manual. I realize that. I'm not so dumb as to not know that.
But I do know what the manual says, and I do know he didn't
operate that device in accordance with the manual. Now, does
that mean that his readings are wrong? I don't know, but it's
of no moment.

And the reason it's not important is because by the time he started taking readings the gas was long gone, long gone. Because you can imagine if you -- if someone were 150 feet up on that tower, they getting off that tower and they're getting off it fast. And don't try to pretend that there's going to be some guy up there who's getting gassed who's going to say, "Oh, yeah, we'll hold up, Darwin. Let's all move aside and let Darwin come up." There ain't no way.

We just -- everybody would be trying to get off that tower. And there was one way up, and there was one way

down. And everybody got down, and then he went up; and it took a long time. So, of course his testing didn't find anything. We can do the same tests right here, but we know the gas is not here. The gas is long gone.

I'd like you to really look at Exhibit 2, their investigative report, because I submit to you it's written in a defensive mode, period. It's not written in a mode trying to find anything out. It's written in a mode to protect themselves.

The key witnesses, we've talked about Paula

Jowell. We talked about Chief McLemore. Dr. Dydek, now, "Tony

Buzbee's mask test is baloney. It's not scientific. He didn't

keep a chain of custody. He didn't do this" -- okay. That's

fine, armchair quarterback. Where is your test? You collected

over a hundred masks. You collected over a hundred masks,

lawyers out there on the site that night. Where are they? Why

didn't you test them?

I was able to get my hands on one mask, and I did my best to test it. And maybe I'm not a scientist; but one thing I know, told you from the very beginning: I, from the mask, cannot tell you how much carbon disulfide was on there. The purpose of the test of the mask is to tell you that it was there. That it was there. And we have to do it -- we have to go about it the other way. There's more than one way to skin a cat.

We know it was present. So, now we have to figure out how much. And the way we figure out how much is based on symptoms. And then it comes down to you deciding whether you thought these ten people were liars. Because for you not to believe that these folks were gassed, you'll have to believe that all ten are liars and the other eight that came in, some of which don't even have cases, were liars, too.

That's what -- now, BP hasn't come out and said, "You're a liar, you're a liar." But that's -- their whole case comes down to that, that these workers, 18 or so of them, they're liars, they're not telling the truth. When they passed -- they didn't really pass out, even though there was several witnesses who saw it. They didn't really throw up blood, because they didn't collect a sample. How many times when you've thrown up have you collected a sample right then so you could have proof of it? That's ridiculous on its face.

Now, who did we not -- one person we heard from is Jeremy Gracia. Do you-all remember him? Remember the young man who he came in and he talked about an event that occurred on January 14th of 2008, well after this one, a process safety management event that had a great impact on his life? Let me tell you something. These releases and spills and leaks have major consequences. Major consequences. Lay aside the ISOM event -- which you've heard a little bit about, not much, in -- 2005. We're talking about events that are still happening,

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January 14th of '08, that have major impacts on people's lives.

Who did we not hear from? We didn't hear from one operator of the adjacent units. They didn't bring the SRU operator. They didn't bring the Cat operator. They didn't bring any operator, any BP operator, other than Darwin Perren. That's all they brought.

They brought some guy from Cherry Point to tell us about an SRU Unit in BP Texas City. What does that tell you? They didn't bring anybody in maintenance. Did they come in here and say, "No, we're not seven years behind on maintenance"?

You're wrong, Tony. We have been spending "No. proper money on maintenance and inspections." Of course, they're going to say that. Because we know it's not true, that they're way behind. And that's why this plant is so old and dilapidated. It is in bad shape, and that's why people continue to get sick out there.

They didn't bring in any -- not even a person from the investigation team, not one. They brought in this guy, Mr. Trapp, who wasn't a part of the investigation team. That's what you call "window dressing." They brought in professional witnesses who are called in when companies have big problems, and they came in as window dressing and tried to convince you that the sky is not blue.

Let me tell you, there's experts out -- I've been

1 around this business long enough to know that there are 01:54 2 particular experts, you pay them enough money and they'll 3 smooth things out for you. And that's what was attempted here. 4 BP's strategy -- this is their trial strategy, 5 just like their corporate strategy: If I don't see it, didn't 01:54 6 happen. If I didn't see it -- I mean, it's like saying I walk 7 along the beach over here and I see footprints and then I take 8 the position, "Well, those footprints are there; but there's 9 really no one walking there." That's just asinine on its face. They guys did not find the source because they 10 01:54 11 didn't want to find the source. And I guess we could look at it two ways. We could say, "They tried real hard, Tony. 12 13 They're just incompetent." That's one way. Or the second way 14 is they really didn't want to find it. Either way is 01:55 15 unacceptable. That's their corporate philosophy. 16 Even Secretary James Baker -- even Secretary 17 James Baker, the head of the investigative committee, said that this company has a corporate blind spot to process safety 18 19 management. Now, this is after a long and troubled history, a 20 long and troubled history. They still have this problem. 01:55 After repeated OSHA violations, after repeated TCEQ violations, 21 22 after repeated -- I mean, you can -- you can imagine what 23 they've gone through, but nothing has changed. Not one thing. 24 I asked this -- this plant manager. He said, 25 "Yeah, Tony, we turned the corner in 2007." Two months ago 01:55

they got cited again 439 times because they simply had not done any of the audits of their pressure safety relief valves, any of their inspections.

And there's -- there are companies that are too big to be regulated. Those companies exist. This is one of them. They didn't even mention the pressure drop of the Cat Unit. And, obviously, we talked about it. They didn't mention the SRU pressure data, because they never produced it.

Their conclusion was there were no operational upsets, in the report. No mention of the other incidents, the pressure drops, no pressure data from the SRU Unit.

And, incidentally, you remember the guy, two hours later --

What was his name, Sean?

MR. O'ROURKE: Gomez.

MR. BUZBEE: Mr. Gomez, two hours later he comes out and they say, "What the devil are you doing here?" Remember he was driving down and they got gassed and they all jumped out and was ripping off their shirts and so forth? He never heard an alarm. He was never told anything was going on.

We know for a fact that the alarm was not -Darwin Perren wouldn't take any responsibility for it. It was
probably because it wasn't his -- it wasn't his duty to set off
the alarm. A lot of people could have avoided this just with a
proper alarm. They don't mention the alarm at all in their

01:56 1 investigation report.

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What they did was they minimized the incident. They sugar coated it; they downplayed it; they made pretend like it wasn't a big deal. We know for a fact that within two hours of this happening that Jerry Duke called TCEQ and said, "There are some people with medical issues" -- this is what he said -- "but there was no release here."

Now, remember they said they did a -- what was that word -- a robust -- you don't hear that very often, do you -- a robust investigation, five weeks even. They had already made their conclusion within two hours. Certainly, that's what they told the authorities.

Let me tell you something. Having been -- having worked for the federal government in several capacities myself, I can assure you that the federal government and OSHA and TCEQ, the state are busier than one-armed paper hangers. Okay? We know that. They do the best they can. But when they're lied to, a lot of times they don't have the ability to ferret that out. That's a fact. All right?

And that's why we have courts, because the ultimate decision maker on BP's conduct is not OSHA and it's not TCEQ, because they don't have any proceeding where you can put somebody on the stand and cross-examine them and ferret out the real truth. It's in a court of law and a jury.

BP's trial strategy is to ignore its own wind

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data. Do you remember the wind data? I didn't do a good job on the cross-examination, but this was the wind data. Remember their expert said, 20 minutes leading up to the event, that's the key wind data. This was BP's wind data from the closest source to where this occurred. Look where the wind was coming from. It doesn't say -- there's one point here. It's east-southeast.

Their entire defense rests upon the fact of the prevailing wind from the southeast. Show me a document that says that. Show me your wind data that says that. It doesn't exist. That's just people saying stuff. There's the facts.

You've got Wheeler saying it's from the north, and then their investigation report -- now, remember, there's two winds you got to focus in on here. I don't think any of you -- and I may be wrong -- bought that at all, that it came from off site. It jumped Valero -- it came from the docks, it jumped Valero, no one got sick, no one got sick at the docks, and then it landed on BP. Now, does anybody really buy that? Do I need to spend time on that? Because that's ridiculous. That violates common sense.

One thing you see in the charge is you don't check your common sense at the door. There is no evidence of anybody in Valero, any surrounding facility, from the train docks, anyone, getting sick or any release whatsoever. To believe that and to let them walk, you would have to suspend

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belief. That some release went straight up in the air when the wind was going this direction, completely opposite, somehow found its way over BP and then literally parachuted in right on top of Pipestill 3B, that's just ridiculous; but that's their defense.

The winds are relevant because the release came from inside the plant. And you may say, "Well, Tony, why didn't they pick it up, because we know the wind, after the release, shifted?" There's no doubt the wind, after people got sick, shifted southeast. You can look at Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23. But at the time leading up to the people getting sick, it was coming from the north.

So, let's say it came in -- the release happened inside the plant and then the wind shifted from southeast and blew it out of the plant. Then you're wondering, "Well, why didn't it get picked up on the Texas City monitoring station?" Well, because they don't pick up carbon disulfide. It makes complete sense. Those monitoring stations, everyone admits, do not detect carbon disulfide.

So, BP's trial strategy, besides just pretend something didn't happen, stick their head in the sand, is just to attack the testing, even though they didn't do any themselves, minimize the incident and spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to prove something that would violate all principles of common sense.

So, here we are. No one died. One man has a back injury that needs treatment. "But you're not asking for thousands and thousands of dollars; so, why are you putting us through this?" You're probably wondering, "Why are you putting me through this?" Because just because no one died this time we know for a fact doesn't mean somebody is not going to die next time. And until this stops, until it stops, it's going to continue. Because we know it continued after this. It continued.

And I won't go through all of them, but just on and release after release and people getting sick. Nothing changed. And all of this happens during this \$2 million fancy monitoring they were doing. Because they were being reactive and not proactive.

You can go out there and monitor till the cows come how. But until you fix your pipes, maintain them, inspect them, what's the purpose? You're just putting up window dressing so when you come into court you can try to convince eight people that, "Oh, we've turned the corner."

Look at -- look at the \$2 million monitoring documents. What? Plaintiffs' 13? Plaintiffs' 13, remember that big stack I showed you some of it yesterday? With their expert, their last one?

In that document, it shows that 15 people went to the hospital just in the time frame they were doing this fancy

monitoring, the digging in the dirt -- just digging in the dirt causes benzene exposure and other VOC exposure -- that there were multiple odor events with people getting sick in that 315 days of monitoring and many, many, many were never sourced. I mean, what does it take? The point is you have to inspect, maintain, repair, and replace, not just monitor.

Now, why does this matter? Well, for every person that goes in that plant -- every person has a story. Sometimes you're walking down the street. If you think about it, when you look at somebody, you say, "That person has a story, and that person has a story." We're talking about people, not just the workers themselves. We're talking about people who have families. We're talking about what matters in this life.

We're not talking about how much profit BP can make or whether BP can cut staffing or -- really, inspections or any of that now. We're talking about people. I mean, we're talking about people.

I mean, Rosa did not sign on to go work out there so she could get gassed and bring that home to her kids. I mean, that's ridiculous. I mean, these are the people we're talking about. These people have families, and they are loved. And they should be -- they should get respect. And they shouldn't be treated like criminals, and they shouldn't have guards on them to go to the bathroom just because they got

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sick.

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Each one of those people are loved and treasured by somebody in their family, every one of them. And they should get the same dignity and the same respect not to be put in a situation, with no warning whatsoever, and then treated like criminals when BP does something wrong. That is not the way to treat people. Frankly, that's not the way to treat those workers, that's not the way to treat -- if you're a good neighbor, that's not the way to act. That's just not the right way to do things.

I mean, we saw on the stand all the TCEQ reports when he claimed they were a good neighbor. They were gassing people at Dow. I mean, come on. When does it stop? To BP, these people are third-class citizens. That's a fact. And you can tell by the way they treated them, the way they cross-examined them, the way we set there for almost an hour while they went through 20 years of medical. I mean, is that ridiculous in light of the fact that I told you from the first words out of my mouth in this case that no one was claiming these people were ruined for life? Why do people that way?

At the end of the case, I'm asking you to give each of them their medical damages. We put on a chart their medical. And we got -- thank the Lord that we cannot prove to you that their lungs are damaged. Thank the Lord. I'm happy to say that. But goodness gracious, aren't they entitled to

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have their treatment and their monitoring and their tests paid for? Of course, they are.

You need to give each one of them the appropriate

amount of mental anguish damages and pain and suffering.

That's all in your province, and you have to decide what is appropriate. And I'm not even going to give you a guide because I know -- I've heard you-all laughing -- from outside, when you-all were laughing and I know you-all have spent a lot of time and I hope you-all have gotten to know each other well enough and I hope collectively you come up with something that's fair for these folks. Something that's fair. Because we don't know for sure what's going to happen to them in the future.

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This is a time to hold BP responsible. This is a time that we say, "You know what? You don't follow your own procedures, and they're inadequate. Your equipment is old, outdated, and dangerous. You're seven years behind. You ignore, literally ignore, hundreds of leaks and releases yearly that pollute our atmosphere and expose workers. That's not —that is not the standard that we're going to allow in this community, period, end of story."

How can a company not even be able to identify all the many pollutants it exposes the workers to? How can that be? We're not talking about just, you know, every now and then it happens, a random event, a pipe breaks. You know, you

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don't -- we're talking about something that anybody with common sense could predict is going to happen because it happens over and over again.

Now, at the beginning of this case, I said this, I said this is an opportunity. Now, after I got out of the Marines, I went to law school. My dad was a butcher; and being a lawyer, first person, it was a big deal. And I didn't go to law school to make a ton of money. Let me tell you what I truly believe -- and I know some of you in the jobs you do try to make a difference, too.

It's not just -- maybe it's making a difference just for your children or maybe it's making a difference in the medical profession or in a lawyer profession or whatever, whatnot, but making a difference. I want to make a difference. I want -- I want to effect positive change. OSHA can't do it. TCEQ can't do it. I can't do it. He can't do it. The president can't even do it here. There's eight people that can do this, eight people. And that's you.

Now, tomorrow or whenever you render a verdict, if you don't do it, then there's a responsibility at your feet now. This is the first time all of this evidence has ever been out in the open and been heard by a jury, and you have to do something with it. You have a responsibility. TCEQ and OSHA can't do it. The ISOM incident didn't do it. The incident on January 14th, 2008, didn't do it. But you can do it.

How do you determine -- how do you deter and change conduct? You know, I don't -- I don't even want to use an example of a child because this is much -- much more serious than that. This is much more serious. The ramifications of what we're trying to do here are much larger than that. And by that I mean, you know, use a little school example of, you know, first you -- I'm a spanker. I'll just let you-all know that. A spanking by one swat and then two swats and then all of the sudden you're grounded, no X Box or whatever. That's not a good example.

But the concepts and the principle is the same, and that is this. When someone has been repeatedly punished but their conduct doesn't change, then the punishment has to be harsher. The punishment has to be harsher.

Now, how do you punish a \$3.9 billion company? That's for you to decide, but you have to do it. Because if you don't do it there will be another jury sitting here with some other incident. There's no doubt about that. Because history, if we don't learn from the lessons, has a way of repeating itself. You have that responsibility. You've been given the evidence. I've never seen evidence this strong before. You have to do this.

Let's put in perspective, a hundred -- we hear about billions and millions. Did you know that one million seconds is equal to 11.5 days but one billion seconds is equal

1 to 32 years? That's the difference. That's the difference 02:10 2 between a million and a billion. 3 And, so, the way you punish a company like this 4 one is you -- you have to render a verdict that will make them 5 say, "You know what, the buck truly does stop here. We really 02:11 have to fix this issue now." 6 7 Maybe you'll do one percent of net worth or one 8 day of profit. I mean, what amount of money will it take in 9 punitive damages to make them pull their head out of the sand and stop this corporate speak, corporate lip service, "We're a 10 02:11 11 good neighbor, we've turned the corner," all this jargon that 12 doesn't mean a flip when you compare it to the facts? You have 13 the power to make an impact, the power to effect change. This 14 is the time. 02:11 15 I, a couple of times in this trial, got very I got a temper. I'm sorry. And I have some 16 frustrated. 17 history with some of these witnesses, obviously. But I've done my best to keep all my promises, and I believe I've done that. 18 19 And, so, I'm asking you now to do your duty because now the 20 responsibility is yours. 02:12 21 Thank you, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much, counsel. 23 Why don't we go ahead take our break at this 24 point? 25 We'll break until -- take about a 15 minute' 02:12

break, and we'll come back and hear the closing argument for 1 02:12 2 the defense and the rebuttal. 3 You can leave those on your seat. Yeah, just 4 leave them on the chair. 5 (Recess was taken from 2:12 to 2:36) 02:12 6 (Jury present) 7 THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. 8 All right. Ladies and gentlemen, we're ready now 9 to hear from counsel for the defense. You may proceed with your closing arguments. 10 02:36 MR. GALBRAITH: May it please the Court. 11 12 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 13 MR. GALBRAITH: Thank you, your Honor. 14 Hello. Workplace safety, we think that is what is at the crux of this lawsuit. Workplace safety is very 02:36 15 important to BP. I'm happy that you've now seen just a little 16 17 bit about what all goes into that. You've had an opportunity to meet just a few of the folks who devote their lives to 18 19 worker and workplace safety every day. It's important to us, 20 and it's important to our community; and it's an obligation 02:37 that we take very seriously. We work hard very hard every day 21 22 so that our workers can come to work and feel good about it and 23 so that our community can feel good about having us as a 24 neighbor. 25 We have had some serious attacks on BP in this 02:37

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lawsuit, and I will address them. But I want to tell you that our definition of a "good neighbor" and "being a good neighbor" includes recognition of the fact that if BP believed that it was negligent and that its negligence caused a release from our plant and that that negligent release caused harm to anybody, we recognize that we would be obligated to compensate them fairly and reasonably. But we do not shy away from that obligation. That's not the reason why we're here.

We are here because we have a real dispute about what happened on the night of April 19th, 2007. The attacks on BP, in our view, have nothing to do with April 19th, 2007. It's easy to accuse a big company of being big and bad and assume that they were the cause, but this trial is supposed to be founded and based upon evidence.

We do not believe we were negligent. We do not believe that our negligence caused a release from our facility that night. We do not believe that our negligence caused harm to any of these plaintiffs. That's the ultimate answer to these questions.

I ask you to remember that every one of these plaintiffs was employed by an employer in the State of Texas that had policies in effect for how to take care of workers who allege and claim on-the-job injuries. We had to check with those employers before we could get medical care to them.

So, why are we here? This was a very unusual

event for us. Yes, we said that there are often times when somebody reports a momentary odor five days later and we don't find it or three or four hours later and we don't find it. But to have this many people spread out over this much geography — in other words, massive release — and for us not be able to find it was extremely rare and extremely unusual for us.

Okay. What happened April 19th? A hole watch — and, by the way, this is all set out in Exhibit 2, our investigation report. And I, too, would ask you to please take a look at it, review it and read it, look through it. I think you'll see something completely different than what Mr. Buzbee thinks you'll see. But take a look at it, because you'll see what I'm talking about in here.

On the evening of April 19th, a safety watch or hole watch -- and I believe that her name was Natasha Craven. She is not a plaintiff suing in this lawsuit. But she called on the radio and said, "I smell something." We don't have any doubt that that is true. We don't doubt that Natasha Cravens honestly reported smelling something.

Okay. And what happened when the call comes over the radio? What I hope and believe you've seen is that BP jumped into action. Our investigation started immediately.

At that point nobody knew anything. But what you heard is that within a minute or a minute and a half four BP operators -- it's in our report -- Darwin Perren, Robert

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Pacheco, Steven Boyd, and David Ferland -- I was wondering whether I could remember all those names -- were climbing up as others were climbing down. They were going to the towers armed with their air testing machines.

Why were they going up? Because there were continuous air monitors at every access portal on those towers. They were going up because they honestly really wanted to get to the bottom of this. They really wanted to find the answer. Because they, too -- these are union guys, these are union members, front-line workers. They, too, were committed to workplace safety. It was a head-scratcher to them, too.

They tested the air immediately, and it was very good. What we learned in those very first few minutes was very good and calming, not alarming. Because they had those machines that were able to rule out some very real potentials or possibilities that could have been much worse.

But we know that they found no H2S at any level, they found no VOC's at any level. They confirmed that at every access portal the monitors were on and were working properly and weren't registering anything, weren't in alarm status. That's good. That rules out some things. First of all, it rules out any stream being released that contains any H2S, which, in turn, in just a few minutes rules out any release from the SRU.

Okay. You've seen about how we checked our air,

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we checked our plant, our equipment, and our processes and we also checked out these people. That's good, in my mind, in our minds. That's what you should expect from us.

We spent an extensive investigation. That investigation has been attacked. I think that investigation was honest and real, and I think it was robust -- I'll even say that, too -- and vigorous. How about that?

And after that exhaustive investigation, all we did was rule out any potential source on BP's property. Okay. That's good. That's very good, but we didn't stop there.

One thing that must be remembered is that originally, initially, no one seemed to be suffering. We got them out. We got them off, but they weren't suffering. when that changed, the moment that that seemed -- appeared to be changing, that's when the alarm sounded and that's when the whole unit -- work was stopped and the whole unit was evacuated.

I submit to you that that does not show, Okay. that is not evidence of any conscious disregard. Rather, that shows that we took worker safety seriously, right there. Okay. First of all, the unit, we know, had long ago been shut down, opened up, cleaned, purged, ventilated. People had been working in it for months. Every shift for those months, air readings, air measurements were taken; and they all came back no alarm, calm, no concern. Okay. That's good.

The operators who went up -- Darwin Perren, 1 02:44 2 Robert Pacheco -- see if I can do it twice -- David Ferland, 3 and Steven Boyd -- there you go -- didn't smell a thing 4 themselves, didn't see any cloud, didn't get any hits, 0.0, 5 nothing but 0.0 on any of the monitors that they checked or 02:44 carried themselves. That's good. 6 7 The other thing that we know is that 450 to 8 500 workers were in that unit. Each one of them had an 9 H2S monitor, personal monitor, on their -- on the collar of their overalls. Now, BP requires that every employee, every 10 02:44 11 worker, every contract worker have one of those H2S monitors. 12 BP pays for those monitors. That's a good thing. That's a commitment to worker safety. And none of them, not a single 13 14 one, registered any H2S. In addition to that, we had fixed monitors for 02:45 15 16 H2S all over the plant and we had continuous monitors up at the 17 access portals of this -- of these towers. Okay. We didn't 18 stop there. This is all good so far. 19 We checked with the surrounding units, "Any 20 upsets, any problems, any startups, any shutdowns, any 02:45 21 equipment failures, anything coming off line?" 22 "No problems, steady state, steady as she goes," 23 upwind and down. We didn't stop there. We called out our 24 25 industrial hygienists from their homes that night. Why? 02:45

Because they could broaden the search. They first took their air reading instruments to the plant -- the unit, then the plant, then the community; and they found nothing. That's good.

You have heard that leaks don't fix themselves. Our experience is such that if you have a leak like this it doesn't get smaller, it gets bigger. If you have a pump seal that fails -- and it can fail without negligence. It can fail within its useful life. It can fail without any foreseeability or anticipation, but it's not going to seal itself. It's going to get worse.

And if you have a pipeline that springs a leak somewhere, it's not going to seal itself up, it's going to get bigger, and it's going to get worse. Leaks don't fix themselves, and that's why we called out LDAR, the Leak Detection and Repair team.

Now, what did they add to the investigation? They have their unique, new infrared cameras, hundred thousand dollar cameras, that can actually see volatile emissions that you can't see with the naked eye. They can see it from distances. And we called them out and they scoured our plant and scoured our plant perimeter, focusing their cameras virtually all night long back and forth. And they found nothing, and that's good.

They found one thing, though; and you've heard

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about it. On the southeast corner of our plant at Loop 197 and around 14th Street, every time they went around the plant, they would stop there and focus their camera.

MR. BUZBEE: I'm sorry, your Honor. I don't mean to object; but there's no evidence of this whatsoever in this record, none.

THE COURT: I'm going to instruct the jury that you've heard the evidence in this case and caution both counsel not to refer to anything that's not evidence and did not come from the witness stand or documents admitted. So, ladies and gentlemen, you'll recall the evidence in this case, the testimony. We'll rely upon that.

Let's proceed.

MR. GALBRAITH: Dyron Hamlin, you may recall, we asked him what was the scope and measure, extent of his investigation. He talked about how that night it was significant to him that the LDAR technicians had stationed themselves or positioned themselves on the southeast corner of the plant at Loop 197, by 14th Street, and they smelled acetone when the wind was coming from the southeast.

And you may remember that what was said was that they focused their cameras that way but they couldn't see anything. Acetone, we don't think comes from Valero; and there's no acetone at BP. So, it came from farther away than that.

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But every time they came to the southeast corner of the plant, when the wind was blowing from the southeast, they smelled acetone. And it's interesting to me that the most frequent odor characterization reported that night, other than "I didn't smell anything at all," which was number one, was, "It smelled like acetone," or nail polish remover.

Okay. We didn't stop there. We went to the fixed based monitoring stations. Now, this is not BP. These are the monitoring stations operated by the City of Texas City and TCEQ. And he's right in saying that it doesn't specifically set out a blip for CS2, just like the UltraRAE. It will pick up volatile organic chemicals. And if CS2 is in the air, it will be registered as a VOC. It won't say it's CS2. It won't say it's benzene. It won't say it's anything. It will say it's a hydrocarbon, it's a VOC.

Okay. Those same monitors, they didn't have a CS2 monitor; but they did detect the VOC's and hydrogen sulfide. And they picked up nothing. That's not us. That's the City of Texas City and TCEQ.

And we called out what we refer to as the "professionals," CTEH, Center for Toxicology and Environmental Health. They did come within hours, because they had somebody in the plant monitoring another welding operation somewhere else. But the real guys to investigate this, that set up those huge monitors, didn't show up for 24 hours. But CTEH was on

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the site earlier than that, at least that's the evidence. And they were there for 315 days, at great expense, just to provide worker assurance in the quality of the workspace and the quality of the worker environment.

That's not evidence of a conscious indifference.

A consciously indifferent company would not do that. That's evidence that BP takes worker safety seriously.

I thought it was very interesting that we set up meetings and we had the toxicologist attend those meetings.

There were three meetings on April 26th and April 27th, two in English, one in Spanish with an interpreter, not in Spanish but with an interpreter. Every turnaround worker on Pipestill 3B -- it was scheduled so that every turnaround worker on Pipestill 3B could attend one of those meetings to get their questions answered, to provide some worker assurance.

Dr. Goad said he stayed around after the meeting, to answer anybody's individual questions, and quite a few people stayed and did ask individual questions. And the point is, a company that doesn't care wouldn't do that, wouldn't pay attention to -- wouldn't care about worker assurance. But BP did. It's another example of BP being attuned and attentive to the workers' needs and the workers' concerns. We took worker safety very seriously; and we demonstrated it in countless, countless ways.

One other very good thing that we did is we

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checked on the people. We brought out EMTs and licensed paramedics that night, from their homes, and we set up a clinic and we listened to everybody's lungs and listened to everybody's heart and filled out questionnaires so that we could make sure, "Do you need -- do you feel any need, concern, or care at all? Do you want to see medical care? Do you want to be checked out? Do you want to be evaluated?" And after we got agreement of the employers, we also called out our buses to take them there.

Now, I have to tell you that there's been some talk about the procedures at the hospital that perhaps were not the most sensitive. And I think, as a community, we probably need to pay a little attention to that and see if we can't, as a community, address that issue. But those were not our policies and procedures, and BP is not liable unless BP was proven to be negligent in such a way as to cause these injuries.

Okay. We didn't stop there. We collected wind data. And I'm going to tell you that everybody that night knew the wind was from the southeast. There was no dispute; there was no disagreement. But we collected wind data. This is what you've heard here in this trial.

You remember Charles Taylor, or Chucky T, as he was referred to? He said he smelled it first at the pipestill and then went and got in his truck and drove to Gate 26, which

1 was northwest; and as he put it, "It followed me to the 02:53 2 northwest." 3 Remember Johnathen Vallery -- I'm going to come 4 back to him in the minute -- one of the first plaintiffs. Both 5 of those are plaintiffs in this lawsuit, by the way. 02:53 My point is no one worked harder to get to the 6 7 bottom of this, no one worked harder to find this answer than 8 we did at BP. It was an honest and real effort. 9 Okay. After CTEH's investigation, they presented their findings to us and they said the most likely source came 10 02:53 11 from off site; it couldn't have been on site because of the 12 geography of the observers, the geography of the smellers; it 13 had to come from far enough away that it could disperse enough 14 over distance to reach this large mass of observers. 02:53 15 Have we identified exactly, pinpointed the exact railcar or the exact ship that might have been loading or 16 17 unloading acetone that night? No. No one can. But it's not for lack of effort. It's not for want of trying. No one tried 18 19 harder than we did. 20 Okay. We have heard now that the data from the 02:54 scientists tell us that the likely source was at the rail yards 21 22 or the shipyards. And we also know that they were unloading 23 acetone that very night, loading and unloading, handling 24 acetone that very night. 25 Two things about that. Number one, there's no 02:54

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acetone on our plant. Number two, they handle it off site.

Our industrial neighbors do have it, do load it, and do unload it. And we've now seen records that indicate they were doing that that very night, when our LDAR folks were smelling it coming from the southeast, coming across our plant.

It is the plaintiffs' burden to show you that the source was on our site. It is the plaintiffs' burden to show you that our negligence caused a leak on our site. What have they brought to do that?

Okay. For at least the first week, they brought you a whole lot of stuff that, in our mind, had absolutely nothing to do with April 19th, 2007. We have -- our witnesses have been what I'm going to call a little bit "beaten up" about our history and attacked a little bit about our past. It had nothing to do with April 19th, 2007.

There is -- why did they do that? Why did they do that? Two reasons. Number one, because they don't have any evidence of an onsite source. What is the piece of equipment that supposedly failed from lack of maintenance? What is the unit that supposedly failed for of lack of maintenance? Can't be the SRU.

The second reason is because we have a tortuous history and tortuous past leading to the ISOM event in early 2005. That's our history. We have never denied it. We've never shied away from it. We don't think it has a thing to do

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with April 19th, 2007; but that history is ours. We own it.

We recognize that we -- it will take time for us

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to earn the trust of our community. We're intent upon earning

that trust, and we feel that we've not only turned the corner but we're well along the way. We recognize, though, that

because of that history we have to be extra diligent in

situations like this. And I think that you've seen in our

response to April 19th, 2007, that we were. We take incidents

like this very seriously.

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Under the guidance of Keith Casey, who I'm happy to represent, the agenda has been continuous improvement. work hard every day to make the place safer and better every day. We will all -- after all, we were the ones who shut down the whole plant after Hurricane Rita, shut down the whole plant for a complete rebuild, replacing pipe, updating units, not producing anything, and bringing them up one by one only after they had been completely rebuilt and had a pre-startup safety review that's fairly arduous.

And, in fact, plaintiff says our plant is old. Every unit that was back up and running by April 19th, 2007, was basically brand new, completely overhauled. And, indeed, that's what Fluor was doing in Pipestill 3B. And that's what each one of these plaintiffs was doing; they were doing the same thing to Pipestill 3B. BP was paying hundreds of millions of dollars to rebuild our plant to make it better.

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Now, you've heard that Fluor fenced off this
Pipestill 3B Unit and was in total control of the turnaround.
So, an indifferent company might turn your eyes away and say,
"Call me when you're done." BP didn't do that.

In spite of the fact that Fluor had complete control of the operation and their own safety people in -- on place, in site, we had our BP folks, safety operators, in there checking every job, every work site, sniffing, issuing permits, confined space entry, LOTO.

I want to say we've thrown a lot at you guys. We got a lot of faith in you guys. We've talked about CS2. Your lives are forever changed. Forever and the rest of your life you're going to know what CS2 is and H2S and a TAR is a turnaround and LOTO, even LOTO, when somebody says they won the LOTO, you'll say, "Lock out/tag out?" That was a little aside. But we do have a lot of faith in you.

and say, "Call me when you're done." They made sure that they were out there testing and sniffing and issuing permits and being around in case there was a need for a response like we could provide on April 19th, 2007. That's not the face or the actions of a company that is indifferent. That's the face of a company who is trying to get better every day and who is intent upon earning the trust of the community, as a good neighbor.

Okay. Now, when something like this happens, we

said, initially nobody knows anything. You have to investigate. Ours started immediately. We checked the air; we checked our equipment; and we checked the people. How can it be said, therefore, that we were consciously indifferent, that we consciously disregarded?

We appointed a committee after all of this, after everything that we'd done that we talked about that was calming, not alarming. We appointed a committee. Six people five weeks away from their jobs, three union members, their sole mission was get to the bottom of it, find the answer.

Now, I submit to you that if you are a company which is desiring a cover-up the last thing you would do is put three union members on your committee. Because the union members are the last people on earth who would sweep worker safety under the rug. They didn't.

Read that Exhibit 2. Take a look at it. See our investigation report. What did we find? We found that there was no leak, no release from the BP plant property. We ruled out every potential source on our plant. We found it logical, supported by science that it was one of our industrial neighbors. That has happened before.

There is no way it could have been an onsite source and spread out as quickly as it did. There's no way that an onsite source could explain the geography of these observers. Doesn't happen. It had to come from farther away

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to have enough distance to dissipate to reach these people.

Why are we here, and what have plaintiffs brought? They brought some theories from time to time, but I say no evidence. And, by the way, another example of folks, what we can know about people on site at the time, what's their indication of wind direction, what's their training? They're to evacuate downwind or upwind -- upwind or crosswind, and everybody evacuated southeast.

Okay. One thing I say about the truth and that is, it never changes. It's simple, and it never changes. One thing about plaintiffs' theories, they're always changing. They sued us immediately and they jumped to the conclusion that they had the answer, they had the culprit, they knew what it was, and they said, "We were exposed to H2S, hydrogen sulfide."

Now, that is at a time very early. They had done no investigation, they had gathered no data, they had no wind data, even; and they were completely unaware that every worker on the unit had on his collar a hydrogen sulfide, H2S, personal monitor, 450 to 500 of those and not a one of them registered anything. In addition to that, the fixed monitors you've seen all over the plant and the continuous monitors up the tower, the access portals -- that's a new word I got to learn.

Okay. When they figured that out, they said, "Okay. We were wrong. You were right. We rule out H2S, like you did long ago." And, so, they arrived at the theory that it 03:03

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was a toxic soup. Remember? H2S, SO2, and CS2.

But then -- and that was before the mask was ever tested when they came up with that theory. But then they have since found for reasons, scientific, that convinced them they had to concede, "We rule out H2S, and we rule out SO2. Again, you were right; and we were wrong. It wasn't any soup."

Okay. So, now they say it was CS2 from the SRU Unit. But now we know that CS2 only exists in the plant in the SRU and it only exists in a stream where there's 265 times of H2S or more. And how do they even know that? Just like everything in this case, they know it because we write it down and report it. It comes from us. They came up with the theory that it was CS2 and we -- that was a head-scratcher because we have never released CS2, ever. No refinery does.

But we asked the question. We tracked it down. We followed up; and we found that, yes, for a few seconds in the SRU, we do create, in the process, a little bit of trace elements of CS2 in a stream that's overwhelmed by the amount of H2S; and it's consumed in there, and it never exists without H2S. You can't get one without the other. They come together.

We told them that. But it was still a head-scratcher because we've never had a CS2 release. And this is part of the reason why: because they come together. And if you get any CS2 out that would do anything, even if you get their original calculation of 12 parts per million, which they

now agree wouldn't hurt a flea so it couldn't have been 12 parts per million -- but that was their original calculation -- you would get 3,180 parts per million of H2S that would come with it.

Remember, no H2S monitor alarmed anywhere that night on the SRU, on the Pipestill 3B, fixed monitors, personal monitors, or the continuous monitors up the tower. And, by the way, even at that low dose, 3180, you would be talking about very dire -- not only would it be picked up on monitors, but it would have very dire toxicological consequences. If someone breathed that amount for less than a minute, death could result from that exposure. That's why we don't have those releases. That's why we don't release CS2. That's why we can rule out the SRU. You're just not going to find it in the refinery.

Here's the H2S fixed monitors at the SRU that are designed to provide worker assurance and worker safety.

Okay. Why are we here? What have plaintiffs brought? They found a mask. And the mask was so important —by the way, there's no protocol, nobody tests masks like they've done. There's no protocol in science. Nobody's ever figured that out that that's a good thing to do.

But this mask was so important that they let it sit for months in a smoke-filled office. And Mr. Buzbee says that it was on the opposite side of his office suite, but there's no evidence of that. No one testified to that.

We know it was mishandled. We know it was mishandled because Armstrong Labs found it, got it, and sent a letter saying, "Oh, my gosh. It's been opened. It's unsealed. You can't rely on the results. Do you want me to run it anyway? I'll do it if you want to send me the money, but you can't rely on the results. Do you really want me to do it anyway?"

And Buzbee said, "Run it anyway."

Okay. And, so, Armstrong comes back again, says, "Well, if I'm going to do it anyway, I've got to have a comparison mask. If I'm going to find so-much sulfur, I got to know how much is in there to start. Could be a lot, could be a little because it varies significantly from lot to lot. I got to have a comparison mask."

They said, "Well, we can't find one. We don't have one."

And this time they didn't write a letter. They called and they said, "Do you really want me to do this? Can't rely on it."

And Buzbee said, "Run it anyway."

Okay. Now, they finally said it had some CS2 on it. But yesterday we learned from Dr. Goad -- it's in the Armstrong report -- that you can't conclude what he concludes from it because of all the unintended interferences that could show up on his test read as "CS2." I guess we're just supposed

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to ignore that.

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But through that all, despite how much of this case is hung on this mask and how frivolous and inconsequential and how unreliable that is, the fact remains you don't get CS2 from a refinery, never have. There's never been a report of CS2 coming out of a refinery ever. Not just ours, any refinery. Refineries just don't have it.

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Now, we do have it momentarily in small quantities in the SRU, accompanied by huge quantities of H2S. That's why it's there. Anything that comes out of there goes to a flare, not to protect from CS2 but to protect from H2S which can hurt you.

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which can hurt you.

13 14 Okay. So, when we look at this, we think the plaintiffs have not really attempted to answer the questions about what was the source. They just want you to assume that we're big and bad and so it had to be us. But the fact remains there was no sufficient source of CS2 anywhere on our plant.

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The fact remains leaks don't fix themselves.

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Has there been any dispute of that? Has anybody testified that that's not a valid point, that you would find it later? Is there any evidence contradicting that whatsoever?

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And, further, the odor could not have come from the SRU. I am particularly enamored of this slide because it shows all the variations, if you will, one on top of the other. It can't be explained by, "Well, there's eddies in the wind or

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1 wind currents or something such as that." You have got guys 03:10 2 shoulder to shoulder, some smelling it, some not smelling it, 3 some having symptoms, some not having symptoms. It doesn't 4 match. 5 Now, you remember Johnathen Vallery. I mentioned 03:10 that. In terms of the wind being out of the southeast, it was 6 7 interesting to me one of the very first witness that testified, 8 he is a plaintiff in this lawsuit, he is represented by 9 Mr. Buzbee, and I think you'll -- I'm sure you will remember him. He's the guy who said, "I went to the road at the south 10 03:10 of Pipestill 3B." It was east and west. "I went to the road." 11 I don't know if that's east or west or not. 12 Okay. 13 14 "I went to the south edge of 3B. And the road is 03:10 15 east and west, and I smelled a smell coming from the southeast. 16 And I turned and I walked along that road for a block and a 17 half to my truck. And the whole time, the smell was being brought to me from the southeast. And I smelled it the whole 18 19 time I walked, and the whole time the wind was coming from the 20 southeast." 03:11 And Mr. Buzbee asked him, he said, You don't 21 22 remember much about that wind, do you? How much was it 23 blowing? And he says, Well, it was blowing medium. 24 25 Remember him saying it was blowing medium? 03:11

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And he said, "Well, you don't know much about direction, do you? You say it was out of the southeast, but you don't know which direction the southeast is from?"

And he said, "Yeah, it was coming right here.

The whole time that I was at the south road, walking a block and a half to the west, I smelled it coming from the southeast," by the way, right from to the southeast corner of our plant where the LDAR folks smelled acetone.

Everybody knew the wind was out of the southeast that night. It was reported in the first calls. It was reported on the radio. All the people who opined -- we've talked about all the wind socks that are out there. You can't stand anywhere in that plant without seeing a wind sock. One of the first things you do if there's an odor report is look and see which way the wind's blowing. Why? You heard the plaintiffs say, "We're all trained to do that because we need to know which muster point to evacuate to, which way to go. It's the first thing we do."

Totality of the evidence supports that the wind was out of the southeast. I mentioned it in opening, and I'm not going to belabor it now. But the symptoms, the odors, and the duration of symptoms just aren't supported, don't match, can't all be meshed with the facts. Remember, objective signs and tests, all normal all the time.

Okay. Logic tells us and the science tells us

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that the source was off site, from one of our offsite neighbors. There are many. There's docks; there's rail yards in addition to oil tanking, other industry members that store chemicals, load and unload chemicals. We cannot pinpoint the exact location, but we tried. We tried hard, and we tried honestly and we tried real.

But what we do know is that the most common report after "no smell at all" was "acetone." And we know that upwind of us, acetone was being handled that night. It's the plaintiffs' burden to show that this occurred from an onsite source that we negligently caused and that it thus caused -- our negligence caused harm to these folks.

I submit to you that we would not be subjecting ourselves to the abuse of this trial if we had any belief that we were negligent. We believe we did a good job that night. We believe that we took this very seriously. We still believe we handled this incident with professionalism and with respect, with professionalism and respect for the workers and for worker safety. We took worker safety very seriously.

Now, the plaintiffs -- we have to look at the plaintiffs, and I will tell you right up front we have no doubt that some people sometime that night somewhere smelled something that came across our plant. But we have to look at the plaintiffs' claims. Many that night said, "I didn't smell anything." Now they say they do, they did.

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Many that night said they didn't have any health complaints; now they said they did. No one that night mentioned anything about being held prisoner; and, of course, we've heard a lot about that now.

All at the time said they had lasting effects; but now we know plaintiffs' own toxicological experts characterizes this as something that should be expected to be temporary and transient and, in his words, hours to days, before he found the Spyker article which convinced him that it could be up to nine days or even two weeks. But the Spyker article, we have seen, preceded the OSHA guidelines we relied upon and that was CS2 that had been combusted. It caught fire. And what the guidelines tell us is it's the combustion process that makes CS2 irritating.

And even the firefighters who were exposed to the irritating combustion process, the fire of CS2, had no signs or symptoms after the, quote, first few pre-exposure days -- post-exposure days, first few post-exposure days.

Okay. They also said they have had lasting signs and symptoms in spite of the fact that they were all seen, medically treated by doctors. They were examined and had their lungs listened to. They had their hearts listened to. And they were seen and released to return to work without restrictions, without medications, without follow up, without recommendations for anything, without any abnormalities on

physical exam and without any abnormalities on objective testing.

You remember at the first start of this lawsuit, in opening I asked you to keep a lookout for any objective tests that were abnormal. We're talking about lab studies, blood studies, x-rays, and pulmonary function studies. Those are the tests designed to let us know if there has been any significant exposure. And the evidence is all in now; and all of the objective testing is normal, all normal all the time.

And some of the plaintiffs told their doctors, doctors chosen by Mr. Buzbee, that they had no prior similar conditions. We now know that at least eight of them, in their medical records, had prior medical conditions.

Mr. Munoz would like a significant sum of money for a surgery that, in my mind, he has not done much to show that he really needs it and is ever going to seek it. What he has done is repeatedly failed to show up at appointments, and what he did do is fail to tell his doctor about any prior back problems that we now know he had.

Mr. Buzbee says that I told you in opening the real reason he is here is for punitive damages. And he had each plaintiff, at the end of their testimony, tell you, "I'm here to send BP a message."

In Texas punitive damages are limited to special situations where people in power at a company subjectively were

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aware, really knew of a significant risk of harm and injury, and yet they acted in a way that demonstrated that they just didn't care. There's no evidence of that here. Rather what you have seen is a very real, a very honest, a very robust, a very expensive continual commitment to worker safety. That's not conscious indifference.

And -- okay. They want to talk about our problems in the past and our history which has led us to be under very close scrutiny by the authorities and the agencies. We don't shy away from that. That's okay. That's fine. But OSHA came out -- as a part of that scrutiny, we know we've got to be extra diligent. As a part of that scrutiny, OSHA came out after April 19th, 2007, to investigate. And they had lots of questions and they got their questions answered and they cleared BP.

OSHA is doing that job. They did it following April 19th, 2007. They got answers to their questions. There's nothing outstanding regarding April 19th, 2007; and they cleared BP. That's no evidence of conscious indifference, certainly not regarding April 19th, 2007.

Okay. And any OSHA fines, while they are directly definitely punitive, they go to the public bureau to enhance enforcement. Okay. OSHA is doing that job. We don't shy away from that, but we don't feel we should have to pay additional money to these plaintiffs or Mr. Buzbee just because 03:20 1 that's why he's really here.

Now, finally, the Judge has said that you are to evaluate this evidence on the strength of the witnesses' testimony, what evidence came to you from the witness chair, not what either of us lawyers had to say. Okay. Mr. Buzbee said that his office protected the mask from his cigars. No one testified to that. He should have brought you evidence that the mask was handled properly, but he didn't.

He says he got an anonymous call that a seal was replaced at a sour water tank. No one testified to that; but yet again we followed up, we tracked it down. We found Tank 100, the sour water tank, and we looked at its history and its record and its maintenance logs; and it showed the last time the seals were replaced was in 2004. Those seals have a 10 year expected useful life. They are scheduled to be replaced again in 2014. But in the interim, they are inspected regularly; and there's never been any leak.

Mr. Buzbee, remember he said that the sewers could have been the source because, after all, they're all connected? Nobody testified to that. But, again, we tracked it down. What we learned is that there's no pipe, there's no connection between the SRU and the sewer system. Couldn't have happened. We tracked that down. It's bluster, but it's no evidence.

This case is about the evidence, and the evidence

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just isn't there. That is why we are here. 1 03:22 2 Okay. Please take a look at our investigation 3 report. I think if you read it, you will see that it is a real 4 and an honest effort. Those guys on that committee really 5 tried hard to get to the bottom of this, and all they could do 03:22 6 was rule out all potentials on site. 7 Did plaintiffs prove to you that the exposure was 8 to CS2? Did they prove to you that there was something on our 9 plant that leaked it, that that leak was caused by our negligence? No. That all of this was due to our conscious 10 03:22 11 disregard? No. There's no evidence of that. We submit that he's failed on each of those and 12 that those failures answer the questions in this Court's 13 14 charge. 03:23 15 Okay. Almost done. You ready? THE COURT: You got about 12 minutes. 16 17 MR. GALBRAITH: Thank you, your Honor. I hope to give some of that back. 18 19 We're here because we have faith in you and faith 20 in this process. We have respect for your ability to separate 03:23 right from wrong and to separate fact from fiction and to hold 21 22 burden -- plaintiffs to their burden of proof. 23 I would like to take a moment just to say 24 something personal, which I don't normally do. I went to law 25 school, too, to engage myself in an honest effort to search for 03:23

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the truth. But I thought I could help make the world a better place and make our system of justice work better. And I've always thought that I could help people honestly resolve disputes by seeking the truth, and I've always felt that the truth will set us free. And BP has never asked me to deviate from that course. And I'm very, very proud to represent folks like Keith Casey, Joe Trapp, Mary Clark, Ken Panozzo, and Darwin Perren.

That's who BP is. It's these people. And these are good people. And I'm proud to represent them. Oh, and they've been beat up on that witness stand. There's no question about it. But let me tell you and let me assure you that they are undeterred and they are resolute and their focus is fixed on their mission of enhancing worker safety all day every day for the good of us all.

And I'm thankful that we have folks like them in our industries and in our country. You will never see us embrace fantasies, promote known falsehoods, tell half truths, show portions of a document, or try to mislead, all to win at any cost. Because that is not winning to me.

Okay. I feel it's a great privilege for me to try this case before you. I hope that I -- that we have never told you anything that wasn't supported and borne out by the facts and by the evidence. We've tried real hard to make sure that's the case.

I hope that we have been respectful, because we have striven mightily to show you respect and to show this Court respect and to show respect for this proceeding and, quite frankly, to show respect for these plaintiffs. I think that's important, too. And maybe, through all of that, you've seen just a little bit of taste of our care and our concern for worker safety. We took worker safety very seriously.

We've thrown a lot at you, a lot of terminology, a lot of acronyms. You've learned a lot of organic chemistry, quite frankly, and a lot of toxicology. You'll always know for the rest of your life "dose differentiates poison from cure."

That was true in 1500, and it's true today.

But one reason we're here is because we have confidence in you. We have confidence that you get it, you understand what's at work here, and what's going on here. And with that, I look forward to your verdict; and I thank you for your attention.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much, counsel.

You got ten.

MR. BUZBEE: Yes, sir.

In 1993 I was in Somalia, and we had snipers on the roofs of the buildings so the humanitarian aid workers could hand out aid. And had we not warned the workers and protected the workers from injury or death from the roving gangs that were roving throughout Somalia, it would have been

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criminal, because that was our responsibility and that was our duty. And this lawyer, who's been representing this company, has made a ton of money with all the problems they've had over the years, stands up here and tells you things that I know for a fact are not true. And it's very, very insulting. There are motives in this case. There are people making a lot of money in this case, over at that table.

Where is the conscious indifference? Twenty hours before this happened, five workers were sick. The report was minimized. They didn't source the problem; they didn't put in place air monitoring; and they sent them back in. called "conscious indifference," especially when you put it in context, when you've had 500 releases and spills and leaks in a four year period, especially when you've had 193 in a six-month period. That's called conscious indifference.

You're spending \$2 million to go out there and set up this fancy monitoring -- that, incidentally, people continue to get sick and go to the hospital -- and spend 2 million bucks and come here in front of a jury and say, "Boy, we really care about the workers," in light of your record, you should be laughed out of this courtroom. You can say anything in a court, obviously; but, obviously, it doesn't have to be true. Let's just take one example.

Can you pull that up?

This lawyer, who said, "I tried my best to be

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honest with you ladies throughout this trial," remember he said the monitoring stations down in Texas City, they tested for VOC's? Remember that? Remember when I said they don't test for carbon disulfide and that's why this -- when the wind shifted -- remember, the release happened on the plant. Everybody started recognizing the wind after they started getting sick. Well, we know the wind shifted and started -and started coming out of the southeast. That's given.

But the wind before, the wind that supposedly was bringing this stuff in from some phantom site, it was from the north. It was only after everybody started getting sick the wind shifted and took it off site; and if it went southeast, it went directly into Texas City proper.

They do not test for carbon disulfide in Texas City. He stood in front of you and told you that they did; and he's done that repeatedly in this trial, tell you things that are demonstratively false. Do you see VOC testing anywhere there? No. Because they don't test for VOC's. They test for specific chemicals. Carbon disulfide is not one of them.

He can say things, but he's got to have proof. He just talked about -- this lawyer has been in my law office. I'm not a liar. He knows I had this fancy system because of one worker, one female, who was pregnant and I was very sensitive to it because my wife would have kicked me in the rear had I not been. He knows it. He has been in my office.

He sat in my office, but yet he stands in front of you and 1 03:30 2 tells you something he knows is a baldfaced -- I'm sorry --3 lie. 4 That's credibility. That's what this is about. 5 And you know what, you choose your lawyer based on who you are; 03:30 and he is a personification of BP. And that's a fact. 6 7 The testimony was, "We were told at BP we would leave in the same condition we came in." That did not happen. 8 9 That's worker safety. They failed. Where are these fancy readings from this \$1 million camera? Where are they? Have 10 03:31 11 you seen the evidence? Nope. All you heard is it come out of 12 their mouths. 13 Where are the operators? Where are these three 14 other operators besides Darwin Perren? Remember Perren? He said he was the only one that went up. But you hear him? 03:31 15 There were three others. 16 17 They didn't show up here. They were written in that report, but Darwin Perren says he was the only one. What 18 19 they say -- just because he says it doesn't make it true. 20 The monitoring, look at Exhibit 2. The result of 03:31 the investigation was this: The monitoring was insufficient 21 22 for worker safety. Read it. That's their own conclusion. 23 Now, did they mention the alarms and all the other problems they have? No. But that's one conclusion, is 24 25 that the monitoring system that's in place is insufficient. 03:32

Where are the guys from the surrounding units? 1 03:32 2 He can get up here and say the surrounding units have no 3 Where are they? If it's true, bring them here. problems. 4 He can talk about this anonymous call. I mean, I 5 didn't make the call. Somebody blocks their number and calls 03:32 It's crazy. They said, "Hey, there was a major problem 6 7 with the SRU Unit. They fixed it. "Now, maybe -- I said 8 "replaced the seal." I'm sorry. Semantics. They fixed the 9 seal. The Cherry Point guy, when I finally asked him, 10 03:32 he said, "Oh, yeah, there was some sand issue with the seal." 11 12 Come on, common sense here. 13 Leaks don't fix themselves. They continue to 14 leak. That's the problem they have. Releases, vapor, you can have intermittent releases of vapor. The pressure builds up, 03:32 15 16 the vapor releases. 17 MR. GALBRAITH: Your Honor, there's no evidence of intermittent releases in this record. 18 19 MR. BUZBEE: Said several times by Mr. Trapp. THE COURT: Excuse me, counsel. The jury has heard 20 03:33 the evidence; and you're to rely on the evidence. My 21 22 admonition and instruction earlier regarding the evidence in 23 the case is that lawyers are not giving you evidence. So, 24 they're arguing; and the lawyers are to argue within the 25 confines of the evidence. 03:33

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MR. BUZBEE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Let's proceed.

MR. BUZBEE: The evidence was this. The lawyers for BP told the wind guy, the wind data guy, to focus on 8:45 to 9:00. That was the evidence. The wind from 8:45 to 9:00, after people were already getting sick and coming off the tower, shifted -- started from the southeast. The wind before, from their own wind data, was from the north. This is how the case has been defended. It was -- from the very beginning, you can read it, they circle the wagons.

BP has a tortured history, and it continues. Somebody can sit in front of you, stand in front of you, and say, "We're a good neighbor." But if you live right next to BP, I promise you, you wouldn't agree.

In September of 2009, BP, they found -- OSHA found 260 continued violations, violations that are from the big ISOM that have never been fixed, 260, and then found an additional 439. And I'm not talking about -- you know, I know how OSHA can be nitpicky. I understand. We're not talking about that.

We're talking about failure to inspect, failure to maintain, failure to repair, and failure to replace, 439 new ones and 260 some-odd ones that they had never fixed, to begin with. Even though a lot of people had a lot of trouble and a lot of families were impacted, BP simply disregarded.

Now, responsibility. Even after all this three 1 03:34 2 weeks, they refuse to accept responsibility. And now it's in 3 your hands. Please don't make the three weeks we were here 4 mean nothing. Please don't do that. Make them take 5 responsibility for what they've done here. Thank you. 03:35 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much, counsel. 6 7 Ladies, let me just bring one matter to your 8 attention that I failed to bring to your attention prior to the 9 arguments. You'll receive the exhibits and the exhibit list, 10 03:35 11 and you'll see that Exhibits 247 through 260 on the plaintiffs' 12 exhibit list have been admitted. And I'm obligated to tell you 13 this: They were admitted not for the truth of the matters that 14 are stated; that is, these are some statements of some of the 03:35 15 people at or around the plant. 16 These documents are not being admitted as to the 17 truth of the matters asserted but simply as evidence of notice to BP concerning the workers' complaints. That's how they're 18 19 to be used. 20 So, you would not go through reading them, 03:35 saying, "This has got to be true." You take it as simply the 21 22 plaintiffs' statement that this is notice that BP had 23 concerning the workers' complaints. 24 Ladies, let me ask you to retire to the jury 25 The first thing you want to do is select one of your 03:36

number to serve as the foreperson. That person will direct and guide and orchestrate you through the discussion process.

And, of course, we have then -- we did find the note forms that if you have a question you need to -- that we need to respond to, that the Court needs to respond to, you write it on the note. And please keep those notes in order so that we'll know when -- by number which -- if you do need that, what number it is.

I will not permit you to work past 5:00 o'clock because it just gets dark too soon. So, whatever work you do this evening or if you choose to recess now and go home, that's your business. You can call your own shots.

I'm going to ask you, however, that if you are not completed with your work this evening that you certainly return tomorrow morning no later than 9:00 o'clock. And the building is open certainly prior to that. But you certainly have a schedule that we followed. I hope you'll follow that same schedule.

All right. Ladies and gentlemen, retire to the jury room. I said "gentlemen." Ladies, retire to the jury room.

(Proceedings recessed for evening)

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COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause. January 25, 2010 Date: Cheryll K. Barron /s/ Cheryll K. Barron, CSR, CMR, FCRR Official Court Reporter